






Pricing and Choice of           
























Pricing and Choice of            




Dissertation presented to Universidade Católica Portuguesa to obtain a 




Sebastião Maria Couceiro da Costa Sousa Guedes 
 
 
Under the supervision of 
 
Prof. Dr. João Filipe Monteiro Pinto 
 
 









I would like to thank my parents for their kindness, affection and all the 
support they provided me during my entire life. Their testimony of persistence 
and hard-work has been proved crucial not only in my academic and 
professional path but also in my personal life. 
Secondly, I would like to thank Católica Porto Business School and the 
University of Lancaster for the opportunity to undertake the Double Degree 
Masters Programme, which was a very enrichment experience. I am also 
incredibly grateful to my supervisor, Professor João Filipe Monteiro Pinto, for 
giving me the opportunity to work on such an interesting topic and for all its 
availability over the past few months. 
I also extend my gratitude to Professor Paulo Alves for his precious help in 
the matching process and to Professor Kim Kaivanto for all the support during 
my time in Lancaster. 
Finally, I am grateful to my family, my girlfriend and friends for keeping me 





























This dissertation examines the pricing of project finance (PF) vis-à-vis 
corporate finance (CF) bonds and studies the factors that influence the 
sponsors’/issuers’ choice between off-balance sheet PF bonds and on-balance 
sheet CF bonds. 
Using a cross-section sample of 763 PF and 46,433 similar CF bonds globally 
issued between January 1993 and January 2020, we compare credit spreads and 
pricing factors of the both bond types and analyse their pricing determinants. 
Findings suggest that, although credit ratings are the most important pricing 
determinants for both PF and CF bonds at issuance, investors also rely on 
borrowers’ characteristics as well as on contractual and macroeconomic factors 
beyond these ratings. The results show that credit spreads for PF and CF bonds 
are influenced differently by common pricing characteristics. Additionally, we 
find that PF bonds have, on average, 30.85 bps higher credit spreads than CF 
bonds. This difference decreases to 19.15 bps when we include 
sponsors’/issuers’ characteristics in the pricing analysis.  
Publicly traded firms that prefer PF to CF are smaller, less profitable, less 
creditworthy and have lower asset tangibility. Finally, our results also 

































Este trabalho compara o pricing de obrigações emitidas em operações de 
project finance (PF) face a operações de corporate finance (CF), assim como analisa 
os fatores que influenciam a escolha do promotor/emitente entre estas duas 
tipologias de financiamento por dívida.  
Usando uma amostra de 763 obrigações de PF e 46.433 obrigações 
comparáveis de CF, emitidas globalmente entre Janeiro de 1993 e Janeiro de 
2020, comparam-se os spreads de crédito, e os seus determinantes, entre 
obrigações emitidas em PF (off-balance sheet) e obrigações emitidas diretamente 
(on-balance sheet) pelas empresas (CF). Concluiu-se que, embora os ratings sejam 
o determinante mais importante dos spreads, estes também dependem das 
características dos promotores/emitentes e, ainda, de características contratuais 
e macroeconómicas. Os resultados demonstram que as variáveis determinantes 
dos preços das obrigações influenciam de forma diferente o spread das 
obrigações de PF versus CF. Conclui-se ainda que as obrigações de PF são 
emitidas com um spread significativamente superior às obrigações de CF, em 
média 30,85 bps. Esta diferença diminui para 19,15 bps quando são adicionadas 
as características dos promotores/emitentes às regressões. Com isto, pode-se 
afirmar que o financiamento através da emissão de obrigações em PF é mais 
dispendioso do que o financiamento semelhante diretamente pelos promotores 
destas operações.  
As empresas que optam por PF em detrimento de CF são de menor 
dimensão, menos rentáveis e apresentam maior risco de crédito e menor 
tangibilidade dos seus ativos. Os resultados demonstram ainda que as 
empresas utilizam o regime de PF para captarem elevados montantes de divida 




Palavras-chave: project finance bonds, spreads de crédito, corporate bonds, 
escolha de financiamento por dívida
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Long-term investment is a fundamental driver for a sustainable growth, 
employment and financial stability of any nation. Project finance (hereafter PF) 
has emerged as a leading way to finance long-term and large-scale 
infrastructure projects around the world over the last 40 years (Garcia-bernabeu 
and Mayor-vitoria, 2015).  
The 2008 financial crisis has resulted in stricter regulation standards on 
banks and their lending requirements. Traditionally, PF agreements are 
financed by syndicated loans (Esty and Megginson, 2003). However, Basel III 
required more rigorous monitoring and disclosures, leading to higher funding 
costs. To mitigate the effect of these additional costs in projects internal rates of 
return, sponsors started to look for the bond market as an alternative way of 
funding their projects.  
The mix of debt and equity funding sources has changed during the last 
years as the capital market for project bonds has grown (Scannella, 2012). 
Through the PF bond market, institutional investors have the opportunity to 
participate in infrastructure projects through securities offering higher returns 
(Dailami and Hauswald, 2007). Esty and Sesia (2007) report that a record $328 
billion in PF funding was globally arranged in 2006, a 51.2% increase from the 
$217 billion reported for 2001. More recently, according to the Global Project 
Finance Review data of Thomson Reuters, in 2018 the market reached $282.7 
billion, representing an increase of 21.7% from the record volume achieved in 
2017.  
PF is an economically significant growing financial market segment, but still 
largely understudied, especially regarding PF bonds. Although the extant 




pricing of PF loans (Dailami and Leipziger, 1998; Pollio, 1998; Kleimeier and 
Megginson, 2000; Esty, 2003; Dailami and Hauswald, 2003; Corielli et al., 2010; 
Gatti et al., 2013; Pinto and Alves, 2016), the literature focusing on PF bonds is 
scant. To the best of our knowledge, there are only two empirical studies on 
project bonds pricing: Dailami and Hauswald (2003) study a sample of 
emerging market bonds and show that, on average, PF are issued at 300 bps 
above U.S. Treasury securities and that maturity and credit rating are the most 
significant determinants of PF bond spreads; Navi (2020) examines the credit 
spreads and pricing processes of PF and CF and find that, on average, PF bonds 
have 34.3 bps higher spreads than CF bonds and that, although credit ratings 
are the most important pricing factors, investors rely on other contractual and 
macroeconomic characteristics beyond these ratings. We extend this literature 
by presenting a detailed analysis of the PF bond market in terms of its size, 
industrial, country distribution and contractual and borrowers’ characteristics. 
We also contribute to the extant literature by investigating the impact of 
sponsors’ (for PF bonds) and issuers’ (for CF bonds) characteristics on bond 
pricing. 
Additionally, there are just a few works that empirically investigate the 
determinants of structured finance1 transactions usage by nonfinancial firms 
(Kleimeier and Megginson, 2000; Mills et al., 2005; Hainz and Kleimeier, 2012; 
Subramanian and Tung, 2016; Pinto and Santos, 2019; Pinto and Alves, 2020). 
As far as we know, only Pinto and Alves (2020) examine sponsoring firms’ 
characteristics that determine the choice of PF vis-à-vis CF for a sample of 
syndicated loans. We extend Pinto and Alves (2020) work by presenting a 
                                               
1 Structured finance (SF) is an off-balance-sheet contractual arrangement designed to fund a sole project or 
a specific group of assets, within a special purpose vehicle (SPV) incorporated to serve as a separate 
contracting entity for the transaction parties. SF includes project finance, asset securitization, structured 
leases, and leveraged corporate acquisition activities. See Caselli and Gatti (2005), Esty (2004b), Leland 




detailed analysis of the factors that determine the choice between on-balance 
sheet financing, via CF bonds, and off-balance sheet financing, via PF bonds.   
This paper aims to analyse the pricing of PF bonds and compare with that of 
CF bonds, examining whether the pricing of both types of bonds is determined 
by the same factors. Therefore, we analyse a sample of 763 PF bonds and 46,433 
similar CF bonds, issued between January 1993 and January 2020. Additionally, 
to study the impact of firms’ characteristics on bond pricing and debt choice, 
we extract information from Datastream about 2,133 publicity traded firms 
located in OECD countries that closed bond deals in the same period. As bond 
data extracted from DCM Analytics do not provide firms’ identification codes, 
we hand-matched contractual data extracted from DCM Analytics and firms’ 
characteristics drawn from Datastream.  
We began our analysis examining the contractual characteristics of both PF 
and CF bonds and we find that PF bonds are issued, on average, with 30.85 bps 
higher credit spreads than CF bonds. When we add the sponsors’/issuers’ 
characteristics to the pricing analysis, the difference in credit spreads decreases 
to 19.15 bps. Our findings suggest that although credit ratings are the most 
important pricing determinant for both PF and CF bonds at issuance, investors 
also rely on sponsors’/issuers’ accounting and financial characteristics, as well 
as on contractual and macroeconomic factors beyond these ratings. Regarding 
the sponsors’ characteristics, we find strong evidence that for PF bonds, 
investors only rely on borrowers’ default risk, measured by the sponsoring 
firm’s z-score, and that the spread depends mainly on the assets and cash flows 
promised as collateral and not in other characteristics of the issuer.  
To examine the firms’ choice between PF and CF bonds, we implemented a 
deal-level analysis. Using a sample of 516 PF deals and 36,035 CF deals, we find 
strong evidence that PF mitigates the deadweight costs of asymmetric 




relatively smaller, have lower asset tangibility and seek long-term financing. 
We also find that less profitable firms are more likely to use PF and that this 
funding method is mostly use for larger debt issuances because of the potential 
economies of scale in relation to issuance costs. Results show that PF bond 
sponsors have higher credit risk.  
This work is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews extant literature on the 
determinants of PF loan and CF bond spreads and discusses theoretical and 
empirical backgrounds regarding the choice of PF. Chapter 3 presents the 
research questions. Chapter 4 describes the methodology, sample selection and 
variables used. Empirical results about the pricing of both bond types are 
presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 examines the determinants of sponsoring 
firms’ debt choices. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the study. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1 What is Project Finance? 
Project Finance (PF) is a financing mechanism that involves the creation of a 
legally independent project company from one or more sponsoring firms (Esty, 
2004b). The sponsor provides equity and management for that special purpose 
company (SPC or SPV) that raises non-recourse debt for the purpose of 
investing in a capital asset. The project’s cash flows are the source of funds from 
which the debt will be repaid and only project's assets serve as collateral for the 
loans provided. The assets and the cash flows of the project are segregated for 
financial purposes from its sponsors in order to obtain better credit appraisal. 
The project lenders must rely exclusively on the ability of the project for 
repayment of project-related obligations and have limited or no recourse to the 
sponsor’s cash flows and assets. Thus, PF allows the separation of project credit 
risk from those of its sponsor, so that creditors, investors and other parties 
evaluate the project strictly on their own economic merits (Shah and Thakor, 
1987; John and John, 1991; Esty, 2004b; Brealey et al., 1996). 
The SPV is a standalone company created for the unique purpose of 
investing in an individual project with a limited life. Project companies are 
characterised by a concentrated equity and debt ownership. Typically, they are 
composed of one to three sponsors who provide equity capital, though the 
majority of financing is provided through debt (Esty, 2004b). According to Esty 
(2003), the primarily type of debt is in form of syndicated bank loans. Project 
debt is non-resource for the sponsors so that project’s assets serve as collateral 
in case of bankruptcy (James, 2008). In fact, Esty (2004b) points out that  SPVs 
have highly leveraged capital structures: the average project company has a 
debt-to-capital ratio of 70%, compared to 35% for public companies.  
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Figure 1 illustrates the basic structure of a PF transaction. PF requires an 
extensive set of contractual agreements between the SPV and its creditors, 
suppliers, operators and off-takers. A typical project can evolve 15 or more 
parties through 40 or more contracts. For that reason project finance is also 
referred as “contract finance” (Esty, 2004b; Corielli et al., 2010). This contractual 
structure is designed to determine the operation's management and assign the 
main risks of the projects to the party that is best able to access and manage that 
risk (Yescombe, 2007). In this way, Pinto and Alves (2020) argue that, the risks 
between borrowers and creditors that may arise from the combination of large 
idiosyncratic investments are reduced, as well as information asymmetries and 
agency problems among all parties involved.  
 
The creation of an independent company for a specific project allows 
sponsors to finance large projects off-balance sheet. In this way, the risk is 
transferred to the SPV and project’s impact on cost of the shareholders’ existing 
debt and its debt capacity is considerably less. SPV creates value by minimizing 
the deadweight costs in case of a bankruptcy (Gorton and Souleles, 2005). 
Ayotte and Gaon (2011) also demonstrate that separation of SPV creditors from 
Source: Garcia-Bernabeu et al. (2015).  
Figure 1: Basic Structure for Project Finance: Participants and Agreements 
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the sponsoring firm can limit expropriation in bankruptcy. However, in case of 
losses, sponsors will carry them ahead of debt holders as distributions to equity 
holders are always subordinated to debt repayments.  
From the creditor's perspective, a key difference between conventional 
financing and project financing is that the creditor’s evaluation of the project is 
linked only to the project's cash flow generation capacity (Shah and Thakor, 
1987). Project cash flows are the only basis for repaying debt (Gatti, 2008), so 
lenders must base their assessment on the financial impact that each specific 
risk can have on the project's ability to generate positive cash flows. In addition 
to carrying out a detailed due diligence and risk valuation, it is common for 
creditors to require some pre-requisites for accessing debt, as a significant 
capital investment or the establishment of covenants related to minimum 
coverage ratios (Yescombe, 2007). The main type of debt is provided through 
syndicated bank loans. Debt ownership is thus concentrated in lending banks, 
creating incentives for the constant evaluation and monitoring of the project. 
Brealey et al. (1996) argue that when the construction phase is completed and 
the project is in operation, there is less incentive for creditors to monitor it and 
the bond market can be used to replace existing debt.  
To ensure debt repayment, a contractual payment schedule and a debt 
payment reserve account are used to accumulate funds to pay the principal 
instalment and interest of each period, are established. Thus, the credit risk is 
reduced, allowing loans to be obtained with low credit spreads (Yescombe, 
2007).  
Pinto and Alves (2016) show that PF deals are concentrated in five key 
industries. Utilities, Construction, Manufacturing, Mining and Transportation 
account for 77.3% of all PF lending (value) and 71.0% of all PF deals. Kleimeier 
and Megginson (2000) and Corielli et al. (2010) also present similar results. 
Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) found that 90.9% of a sample of 4.956 PF loans 
from January 1, 1980 to March 23, 1999, is made to borrowers in the 
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Commercial and Industrial, Utilities and Transportation industries. Corielli et 
al. (2010) based on a sample of PF loans closed between January 1998 and May 
2003, show that 52% of the total loans value was awarded to electricity/power 
and other energy utilities, followed by telecommunications with a weight of 
28% and transportation with 14% of the total value. These findings corroborate 
the common understanding that PF is used primarily to fund tangible-asset-rich 
and capital-intensive projects.  
2.2 Why firms choose Project Finance? 
Extant literature suggests several reasons for firms choosing PF instead of a 
conventional on-balance sheet financing.  
Esty (2003, 2004a,b) presents four primary reasons for using PF. Firstly, PF 
can be used to mitigate agency conflicts inside project companies and capital 
providers - agency cost motivation. Problems between ownership and control 
and owners and related parties can be reduced through this type of transactions 
(John and John, 1991; An and Cheung, 2010; Berkovitch and Kim, 1990). 
Secondly, PF can improve risk management- risk management motivation. The 
large number of contracts that involve PF are structured in such a way that the 
project risks are allocated to the parties that are most capable of evaluating and 
managing them (Brealey et al., 1996; Corielli et al., 2010). PF also mitigates 
underinvestment problems that may exist due to distress costs and managerial 
risk aversion (Stulz, 1984). Thirdly, PF can be used to mitigate underinvestment 
due to information asymmetries - asymmetric information motivation. Shah 
and Thakor (1987) argue that the reduction of information search cost is the 
main befit of PF, Fourthly, PF transactions allow companies with little debt 
capacity to avoid the opportunity cost of under investment in positive NPV 
projects - debt overhang motivation (Myers, 1977). Off-balance sheet financing 
has limited impact on sponsor’s creditworthiness and does not impact their 
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ability to incur in additional debt in the future (John and John, 1991; Nevitt and 
Fabozzi, 2001; Fabozzi, Davis, and Choudhry, 2016). Additionally, Leland 
(2007) argues that the nonrecourse debt provides to the sponsor a valuable 
option of walking away in case the project does not generate expected cash 
flows.  
Shah and Thakor (1987), John and John (1991), Chemmanur and John (1996), 
Nevitt and Fabozzi (2001), Kensinger and Martin (1988), Byoun, Kim, and Yoo 
(2013), among others, study the advantages and disadvantages that PF have in 
firm’s capital structure. Shah and Thakor (1987) present cost reduction as the 
main benefit of PF and argue that it allows higher optimal leverage than 
conventional financing, increasing the value of some of the sponsoring firm’s 
projects. John and John (1991) point out that the value of interest tax shields can 
be increased through PF, when compared with corporate debt financing. In this 
sense, Chemmanur and John (1996) show that the SPV’s leverage depends on 
the level of control benefits of the project compared with the sponsor. 
According to Nevitt and Fabozzi (2001), the segregation of the financing 
operations allows the maintenance of sponsoring firms’ financial flexibility, as 
well as limiting the risk of contamination. Lastly, Kensinger and Martin (1988) 
show that riskier projects should be project-financed to reduce signalling costs.  
Despite the advantages described above, there is evidence in the literature 
showing that PF techniques can convey some disadvantages. PF deal is 
expensive to structure and it is highly restrictive once in place (Esty, 2004a). It 
evolves complex transactions in terms of designing the transaction, writing the 
required documentations and implementing adequate due diligence. 
Additionally, the negotiation of financing and operating agreements is very 
time-consuming. According to Gatti (2008), compared to corporate financing, 
PF is more costly.  
Furthermore, Pinto and Alves (2020) point it out that a PF transaction can 
increase the risk of existing on-balance sheet creditors. The structuring of a PF 
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transaction involves the segregation of a subset of assets from the sponsoring 
firm and the transfer to a remote bankruptcy company, the SPV, preventing the 
sponsor's creditors from having access to the project's cash flows. In this way, 
the risk perception of existing creditors may increase if the sponsor chooses to 
fund the projects with the highest NPV through PF. However, Esty (2004b) and 
Bonetti et al. (2010) argue that in practice, these additional costs are more than 
compensated by the advantages that arise from the reduction in the net 
financing costs, off-balance sheet financing, and appropriate risk allocation 
when PF is compared to CF.  
In addition to the advantages and disadvantages above mentioned, literature 
also presents other factors that influence the choice of off-balance sheet 
financing. Hainz and Kleimeier (2012), through a sample of non-U.S. borrowers, 
found evidence that political risk and credit rights are positively correlated with 
the use of PF. They argue that there is a negative relationship between the 
industry’s leverage ratio and the use of PF. Subramanian and Tung (2016) 
conducted a similar study showing that PF is more likely in countries with 
weaker laws and weaker creditor rights.  
Recently, Pinto and Alves (2020) analysed the factors that influence public 
firms’ choice between PF and CF. Using a sample of syndicated deals in OECD 
countries, this study shows that borrowers’ characteristics, contractual 
characteristics and macroeconomic factors affect the choice between PF and CF. 
They found evidence supporting the hypothesis that PF is used as a mechanism 
that facilitates the reduction of the deadweight costs from asymmetric 
information problem. Additionally, they argue that companies that use PF are 
less profitable than comparable companies and that transaction cost 
considerations lead companies, that employ project finance and corporate 
finance (called switchers), to choose PF for new debt. Despite their findings 
show that PF deals do not reduce the cost of borrowing compared to CF, it is 
possible to conclude that public firms choose PF for relatively large amounts of 
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debt to economize on scale, and switchers in the utilities industry with high 
agency costs of debt are more likely to choose PF rather than CF (Pinto and 
Alves, 2020). 
2.3 Project Finance credit spreads 
The existing theoretical literature presents the reduction in net financing 
costs as a motivation for the use of PF. According to Esty (2003, 2004b), PF 
syndicated debt structures reduce funding costs by mitigating deadweight costs 
of market imperfections and frictions, namely agency and asymmetric 
information problems. PF contractual structure provides a framework for the 
asset collateralization and the stipulation of covenants reducing the expected 
default costs (Smith and Warner, 1979; John and John, 1991). Corielli et al. (2010) 
also argue that PF can reduce the sponsor’s cost of debt due to the segregation 
of some assets from their balance sheet. Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) 
showed empirically that PF loans have lower spreads than syndicated non-PF 
loans. Their findings support the argumentation that PF transactions reduce the 
default risk and agency problems and, therefore, the cost of funding.  
However, Lewellen (1971) and Pollio (1998) argue that PF deals are more 
costly than conventional forms of debt. According to Lewellen (1971), PF credit 
spreads can be 50 to 400bp (basis points) higher, since in PF operations creditors 
cannot rely on the cross-collateralized cash flows and assets as in corporate 
financing. Pollio (1998), based on a sample of 330 projects in which 123 were 
financed through PF transactions and 207 by CF, shows that the average loan 
spread in PF is 101bps, which is 32bps higher than the average for conventional 
loans. Pinto and Alves (2020) point it out four main aspects that can explain the 
higher costs for PF transaction compared to CF, (i) legal, financial, insurance, 
accounting and fiscal, engineering and environmental advisory fees (Yescombe, 
2002; Caselli and Gatti, 2005; Esty and Kane, 2010); (ii) time consumption and 
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structuring costs involved in a very extensive, detailed and complex contract 
framework (Fabozzi et al., 2016; Gatti, et al.,2013); (iii) higher credit risk due to 
greater SPV leverage (Esty, 2004a; Esty and Kane, 2010); and (iv) operational 
complexity (An and Cheung, 2010). 
Several studies were also carried out on the factors that influence PF loan 
pricing. Dailami and Leipziger (1998) argue that the spread depends on the 
lender’s perspective of the overall risk of the project and that the existence of 
guarantees and the country risk level are also important factors. Through a 
sample of foreign currency loans for large projects, they conclude that lenders 
require higher credit spreads in countries with higher inflation. Pollio (1998) 
finds evidence that spread is positively related with country risk and negatively 
related with the existence of guarantees and currency risk. In this sense, 
Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) show that average PF loans come from 
countries with higher political and economic risks, and that PF is significantly 
related with country risk, the existence of covenants and the level of project’s 
leverage.  
Pinto and Alves (2016) examine the factors that influence PF and CF loan 
spreads. Based on a sample of 210,273 syndicated loans closed between 2000 
and 2014, they find that PF and Non-PF loans are influenced differently by 
common pricing characteristics and that PF loans in the U.S. and Western 
Europe (W.E.) are priced in segmented markets. Testing the effect of eleven 
contractual characteristics and five macroeconomic factors they show that the 
deal size is significant and negative related with spreads for PF loans in both 
regions. Contrary to Dailami and Leipziger (1998) and Kleimeier and 
Megginson (2000), that argue that loan maturity does not impact PF loan 
spreads, Pinto and Alves (2016) found evidence of a negative impact of 
maturity on PF loan spreads.  
The number of banks involved has a significant and negative impact on the 
spread of PF loans extended to U.S. borrowers, but it is insignificant when loans 
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are arranged for W.E. borrowers. A larger number of banks involved may lower 
the spread because this can be associated with an increase in the certification of 
the transaction and thus mean that a higher number of banks will share default 
risk (Pinto and Alves, 2016). The banks' reputation also influences the credit 
spread. Corielli et al. (2010) and Gatti et al. (2013) show that the certification of a 
prestigious lead arranging bank lowers the spread of PF loans comparing with 
loans granted by less prestigious banks.  
Regarding the loan size, Pinto and Alves (2016) show that an increase in the 
weight of the tranche size to the transaction size will increase the required 
spread for PF loans extended to W.E. borrowers. The authors also found 
evidence that spread and fixed rate are significantly positively related for PF 
loans in the U.S..  
Regarding macroeconomic variables, although Blanc-Brude and Strange 
(2007) found an insignificant relationship between the risk-free rate and the 
pricing of PF tranches for a sample of U.S and U.K. Public-Private Partnerships, 
Pinto and Alves (2016) show that the risk free rate is significantly and 
negatively related to PF loan spreads closed by W.E borrowers. Sorge and 
Gadanecz (2008) and Hu and Cantor (2006) show a significant and positive 
relation between PF loan spreads and the yield curve slope. Finally, Pinto and 
Alves (2016) demonstrated that in higher market volatility scenarios there is a 
higher demand for syndicated loans vis-à-vis other debt alternatives, finding a 
significant negative relationship between market volatility and the spread for 
PF loans. 
2.4 Project Finance Bonds 
PF bonds are securities issued by private (or public-private) project 
companies to finance a specific project. Issuing project bonds would expand the 
investor base, from bank loans to a border capital market. Project bonds may be 
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public issues (placed with bond investors through the stock exchange) or 
private placement (placed with a limited number of bond investors). Bond-
based financing model aims mainly at the non-banking market and takes the 
form of a tradable financial instrument (Scannella, 2012).  
As discussed before, the project company raises debt without recourse (or 
with limited recourse) to the sponsors. The cash flows generated by the project 
will be used to pay off coupons and principal amortization. Thus, bondholders 
must rely exclusively on the ability of the project for repayment of project-
related obligations. 
PF bonds are mostly used to finance major projects and infrastructures from 
their early stages. These types of projects are known as Green Field projects and 
the bond issuance process is subject to several procedures, including: (i) the 
setting-up of an SPV; (ii) the preparation of technical reports relating to the 
market, insurance and other relevant documents, which are subsequently 
requested by rating agencies; (iii) credit rating or bond rating development; and 
(iv) the writing of the marketing offer and presentation circular (Rossi, Stepic, 
and Alerassool, 2015). 
A typical PF is mainly financed by debt. Banks provide 2/3 of the debt and 
the rest is financed through bonds or multilateral development agencies 
(Scannella, 2012). In PF, among the advantages of PF bonds over bank loans is 
the fact that bonds generally offer longer maturities and are issued with fixed 
coupon payment, allowing a wide range of participants to invest in the project. 
Additionally, according to Scannella (2012), in some markets it is possible to 
issue bonds with the interest rate linked to the inflation rate, if the project’s 
revenues are linked to inflation. However, PF bonds present higher transaction 
costs, higher disclosure requirements and, if the project gets into difficulties, 
negotiations with banks could be kept confidential, while negotiations with 
bondholders may be publicized and less flexible (Scannella, 2012). Furthermore, 
bond-based financing methods require at least one or two credit ratings, 
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depending on the type of project and the volume of funds required. Moreover, 
bonds are typically issued without a call option, which makes impossible to 
amortize the principal before the bond maturity date (Rossi et al., 2015).  
The main difference between PF and CF bonds is related to the guarantees 
provided to bond holders in case of default. In a PF, the bond is issued for the 
purpose of financing a single capital investment project, whose cash flows are 
the only source for meeting financial obligations. In the case of CF , the security 
is typically issued against the firm’s general creditworthiness and the 
underlying assets consist of multiple sources of cash flows (Dailami and 
Hauswald, 2003).  In PF bond market, as the project’s cash flows are the unique 
source to meet debt obligations, if the project fails and the single source of cash 
flow ceases, the SPV experiences a liquidity crisis that might force it to default 
on its bonds. PF bond’s investors are, therefore, very cash-flow oriented and 
demand much more careful analysis of factors that determine the underlying 
economics of the project and the issuer’s economic and legal structures (Dailami 
and Hauswald, 2003).  
The project bond market is highly concentrated in the U.S., accounting for 
more than half of the global issuance of project bonds (Scannella, 2012). To 
enhance this alternative financing mechanism in Europe, the European Union 
(EU) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) promoted the Europe 2020 
Project Bond Initiative (PBI). This program aims to use European funds for 
credit enhancement to increase the appetite of institutional investors – such as 
pension funds and insurance companies – to boost large-scale infrastructure 
financing (Vassallo et al., 2018). This program consists of injecting funds into the 
projects, protecting it from credit risk and increasing its creditworthiness. Thus, 
the purpose was to improve access to financing for SPVs by providing them 
with PF bond issuance capacity (Rossi et al., 2015).  
The 2020 PBI was launched based on the fact that the EU, through the EIB, 
may provide either a layer of subordinated debt or a stand-by liquidity facility 
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to projects to reduce the exposure to the project risk by senior lenders (Vassallo 
et al., 2018). The subordinated debt layer will reduce the portion of senior debt, 
but if the cash flows generated by the project are still not sufficient to repay the 
senior debt, the stand-by liquidity mechanism will provide funds for that 
purpose. The European Commission guarantees these two funding mechanisms 
up to a certain level. As presented in figure 2, the SPV would divide its debt 
into two layers: a senior debt, to be placed with institutional investors; and a 
subordinated debt obligation, which would be underwritten by the EIB 
(Vassallo et al., 2018). During this process, the EIB evaluates and selects projects 
according to its own metrics, structures the financing instruments and monitors 
the projects.  
 
Figure 2: EU Project Bonds structure 
 
 
Source:  adapted from Vassallo et al. (2018).  
 
There are only two studies related to ours. Dailami and Hauswald (2003), 
based on a sample of 105 bonds, issued between January 1993 and March 2002 
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with the purpose of finance infrastructure projects in development countries, 
analysed the pricing determinants of PF bonds. They show that, on average, PF 
are issued at 300 bps above U.S. Treasury securities and that maturity and 
credit rating are the most significant determinants of PF bond spreads. They 
also show that legal and regulatory obstacles have relevant and positive impact 
on spread and that investors take into consideration not only the contractual 
features of the project, but also the quality of the institutional environment and.  
More recently, Navi (2020) through a sample of 763 PF and 46,433 
comparable CF bonds issued between 1993 and 2020, compares credit spreads 
and pricing processes of PF and CF to analyse the main differences in terms of 
pricing determinants. The author shows that, on average, PF bonds have 34.3 
bps higher spreads than CF bonds and that, although credit ratings are the most 
important pricing factors, investors rely on other contractual and 
macroeconomic characteristics beyond these ratings. PF bonds and CF bonds 
are priced differently by common pricing factors and, for PF bonds, the most 
important pricing determinants are credit rating, maturity, transaction size, 
number of banks, interest rate type, if the bond is collateralized, rule of law, 
GDP per capita, country risk and the level of interest rates. 
2.5 Corporate Finance Bonds 
CF bonds are debt instruments issued by corporations, governments or 
public institutions to finance investment in fixed assets, restructure debt or to 
fund working capital (Laroza, 2015) . The issuer (also called the debtor or 
borrower) must have to repay the amount borrowed (the principal) plus 
interests over a specified period. A typical (“plain vanilla”) bond specifies a 
fixed date when the principal is due and the contractual coupon rate and the 
amount of interest, which can be paid quarterly, semi-annually or annually 
(Fabozzi, 2007).  
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In this sense, companies issue bonds to raise capital to finance their activities. 
CF bonds offer great financial flexibility as they can be design according to the 
characteristics that fit with issuer’s funding requirements and are not 
necessarily backed by specific guarantees (Duffie, 1998).  
According to Pinto and Santos (2019), the credit spread of CF bonds can be 
defined as “the margin yielded by the security at issue above a corresponding 
currency treasury benchmark with a comparable maturity (option adjusted 
spread)”. The treasury yield curve is used as a reference due to the riskiness 
and liquidity of this type of securities.    
Virtually all of the empirical studies on straight bond spreads found credit 
ratings to be one of its most important determinants (Collin-Dufresne and 
Goldstein, 2001; Elton et al., 2001; Hull et al., 2004; Gabbi and Sironi, 2005;  
Longstaff et al., 2005). Researchers also found other factors to be important, like 
maturity (Fons, 1987; Sarig and Warga, 1989; Helwege and Turner, 1999), 
liquidity (Longstaff et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2007), systematic risk (Elton et al., 
2001; Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Longstaff et al., 2005), incomplete accounting 
information (Flannery et al., 2012), leverage (Flannery et al., 2012), and taxes 
(Elton et al., 2001). According to Campbell and Taksler (2003) and Krishnan et al. 
(2005), market variables like the level of interest rates, the slope of the yield 
curve and market volatility, also have a significant impact on straight bond 
spreads. Focusing on bank bonds, Zaghini (2014) show that credit rating, 
government guarantees, sovereign credit risk, and the systemic relevance of 
issuing institutions affect significantly their spreads. 
Extant literature also points out additional spread determinants. Elton et al. 
(2001) argue that, although rating is the most important determinant, 
characteristics such as coupon rate, time for issuance, trading volume and face 
value also convey information about CF bond spreads. Gabbi and Sironi (2005) 
found that CF bonds’ expected tax treatment, represented by coupon, has a 
positive impact on spreads. Duffie and Lando (2001) argue that after issuance, 
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bondholders are not kept fully informed about the firm. Incomplete 
information has significant implications for the level and shape of the term 
structure of secondary-market yield spreads, that is related to the excess over 
risk-free rates at which CF bonds prices are quoted in public market (Duffie and 
Lando, 2001).   
Pinto and Marques (2020), using a sample of 24,525 European CF bonds 
issued by financial and non-financial firms over 2000 to 2016, also show 
evidence that, besides credit rating being the main determinant of CF bond 
spread, investors rely on other aspects such as maturity, transaction size, bank 
reputation, number of banks involved, country risk, legal enforcement and 
market volatility. The level of interest rates and the yield curve slope are also 
important determinants (Campbell and Taksler, 2003). In addition, the inclusion 
of call, put and conversion options also affect CF bond spreads (Navi, 2020).  
Sargent (1979) studies the rational expectation theory and argues that the 
decisions made by firms are not irrational decisions because of the availability 
of perfect information, and thus, firm specific factors could influence changes in 
corporate credit spreads. Thus, factors such firms’ credit and financial risk, size, 
level of debt and profitability are also important determinants of CF bonds 
credit spreads (see also Fisher, 1959; Fama and French, 1993; Esho, Lam, and 
Sharpe, 2001; Denis and Mihov, 2003; Flannery, Nikolova, and Ôztekin, 2012; 
Bai and Wu, 2016). 
3. Research question and hypotheses 
Extant empirical literature on CF bond pricing presents credit rating as the 
most significant determinant of credit spreads at issuance (Collin-Dufresne and 
Goldstein, 2001; Elton et al., 2001; Hull et al., 2004; Gabbi and Sironi, 2005;  
Longstaff et al., 2005). However, other pricing factors like transaction size, 
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number of banks involved, bank reputation, country risk, tax premium, legal 
enforcement, and market volatility also affect credit spreads (Elton et al., 2001; 
Duffie and Lando, 2001; Campbell and Taksler, 2003; Gabbi and Sironi, 2005; 
Krishnan et al., 2005; Pinto and Marques, 2020). Additionally, firms’ 
characteristics such as size, credit risk, profitability and leverage are also 
important determinants of CF bond spreads (Elton et al., 2001; Collin-Dufresne 
et al., 2001; Longstaff et al., 2005; Flannery et al., 2012) . As PF bonds have 
different characteristics than CF bonds, we expect that the common 
determinants of CF bond affect differently PF bond credit spreads. Contrary to 
the straight bonds, where the spread depends essentially on the issuing firm’s 
characteristics, the spread of PF bonds depend, instead, on the project cash 
flows and on the credit enhancement mechanisms used (Liu et al., 2006; Pinto 
and Marques, 2020). 
We intend to extend Dailami and Hauswald's (2003) and Navi's (2020) works 
by including in our analysis sponsors’ (for PF bonds) and issuers' (for CF 
bonds) accounting and financial characteristics. Liu et al. (2006) and Pinto and 
Marques (2020) argue that structured finance security credit spreads depend 
mainly on the assets and cash flows promised as collateral, and on the credit 
improvement mechanisms used. Due to the non-recourse characteristic of PF 
debt, PF bond spreads depend essentially on the project creditworthiness and 
not on the sponsors’ accounting and financial characteristics (Fabozzi and Vink, 
2012). This leads us to hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 1 [H1]: PF and CF bond issues are priced differently by common 
pricing factors and, as for CF bonds, investors rely on other factors besides 
credit ratings when pricing PF bonds. 
 
Regarding the credit spreads, Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) showed 
empirically that PF loans have lower spreads than syndicated non-PF loans. PF 
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transactions can reduce the sponsor’s cost of debt, due to the segregation of 
some assets from their balance sheet (Corielli et al., 2010) and also the default 
risk associated (Kleimeier and Megginson, 2000). Under this framework, we 
propose: 
 
Hypothesis 2 [H2]: PF bonds are issued with lower credit spreads than 
similarly rated CF bonds. Therefore, PF transactions allow the reduction of 
sponsors’ cost of borrowing when compared with CF transactions. 
 
However, some researches such as Lewellen (1971), Pollio (1998) and Pinto 
and Alves (2020) found evidence that PF is more costly than CF. These 
arguments lead us to propose the opposite of what H2 predicts:  
 
Hypothesis 3 [H3]: PF bonds are issued with higher credit spreads than 
similarly rated CF bonds. Therefore, PF transactions do not allow the reduction 
of sponsors’ cost of borrowing when compared with CF transactions. 
 
Based on extant literature, the choice between off-balance-sheet financing 
and on-balance-sheet financing is mostly affect by: i) asymmetric information 
problems (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) – according to Myers 
and Majluf (1984) firms with high deadweight costs of asymmetric information 
are more prone to underinvestment; ii) agency costs - higher leverage creates 
incentives to risk shifting, claim dilution and sub-optimal investment, thereby 
increasing conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976); iii) issuance costs - according to Blackwell and Kidwell (1988), 
larger debt issues can result in economies of scale in relation to issuance costs; 
iv) cost of funding - firms will always look for the least expensive funding 
alternative to finance their activities, and; v) firm’s profitability – profitable 
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firms  are more likely to use public debt to signal managerial prospects of 
future earnings (Denis and Mihov, 2003).  
PF structure can help to reduce asymmetric information because the 
separation of projects from the sponsoring firms facilitates initial credit 
decisions (Corielli et al., 2010). In addition, the extensive and detailed networks 
of contracts between the parties involved increase the amount of information 
disclosed to creditors (John and John, 1991; Gatti et al., 2013). This leads us to 
hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 4 [H4]: Firms with higher information asymmetry prefer PF to 
CF. 
 
Regarding agency problems, PF reduces leverage-induced underinvestment 
through separate incorporation and nonrecourse debt (Myers, 1977; John and 
John, 1991). According to Brealey et al. (1996) PF can reduce the debt-overhang 
problem by assigning project returns to new investors rather than existing 
capital providers. In addition, the PF contractual structure acts as a disciplinary 
device to reduce the potential inefficient effects of agency problems on 
corporate loans (Pinto and Alves, 2020). Similarly, the off-balance sheet 
treatment of the funding allows firms with higher growth opportunities to 
avoid the opportunity costs of underinvestment (Esty, 2003). Under these 
frameworks, we propose: 
 
Hypothesis 5 [H5]: Firms with high agency costs of debt and with more 
growth opportunities are more likely to choose PF rather than CF. 
 
PF involves various transaction costs and is very time-consuming (Esty, 
2004a; Gatti, 2008). Thus, we expect that firms choose PF for larger debt 
 
 39 
issuances because of the potential economies of scale, which leads us to 
hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 6 [H6]: Borrowers choose PF over CF when issuing large 
amounts of debt. 
 
The off-balance-sheet treatment of the funding raised avoids contamination 
risk and allows the preservation of financial ratios, with a limited impact on 
sponsors’ creditworthiness (Pinto and Alves, 2020). We thus expect firms with 
lower profitability to use PF rather than CF. This leads to our last hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 7 [H7]: Firms with lower profitability are more likely to choose 
PF over CF. 
4. Data, methodology and descriptive statistics  
4.1 Sample selection 
The sample consists of individual bond offers extracted from the DCM 
Analytics and covers from January 1993 to January 2020. DCM Analytics 
database provides detailed information on bond securities issued on the debt 
capital markets. Information is available on the micro characteristics of the 
bonds (e.g., rating, transaction size, maturity, currency, type of interest rate) 
and of the issuers (e.g., name, nationality, industry sector). We included only 
bonds with a deal type code of “corporate bond investment-grade” and 
“corporate bond high-yield”, classified as with either fixed rate bonds or 
variable rate bonds, and with information available about the credit spread. As 
our main focus are PF transactions, bonds issued by financial institutions, with 
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a deal general industry group “Finance” or “Insurance”, were deleted.  DCM 
Analytics does not have a deal type code of "project finance bond", so we 
classified as PF bonds those for which the use of proceeds is "project finance". 
The remaining bonds were classified as CF bonds. To have a more comparable 
sample and to avoid selection bias problems, we selected only CF bonds for 
which the deal industry has at least one record of PF bond issuance.  
After applying these screens, we can examine a total sample of 47,196 bonds 
worth $17,218.1 billion, of which 763 bonds worth $282.7 billion were classified 
as PF bonds and 46,433 bonds worth $16,935.3 billion as CF bonds. We call to 
this sample our Full Sample (FS). 
As we intend to analyse the impact of issuer’s characteristics in the bond’s 
credit spreads and also the firm’s choice between PF and CF, we collected firm 
specific accounting and market data from Datastream. DCM Analytics does not 
provide an identification code, so data from DataStream was merged with deal 
information from DCM Analytics by hand-matching issuer’s name for CF. For 
the PF deals, as these bonds are issued by vehicle companies, we hand-matched 
the sponsor with the highest equity ownership in the PF firm with Datastream 
by using the sponsor’s name. This approach allows the bonds to be matched 
with the ultimate party responsible for the financing choice decision. Following 
the same rationing of Pinto and Alves (2020) and Carey and Nini (2007), to 
reduce the problems of unmeasured credit quality correlated with nationality, 
we only collected information about companies with deals closed in OECD 
countries.  
After merging firms involved in the transactions with Datastream and 
applying the screens mentioned, we are able to analyse a sample of 22,863 
bonds issued by 2,133 publicity traded firms located in OECD countries 
between January 1993 and January 2020. This sample is called the High 
Information Sample (HIS). 
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Panel A of Table 1 presents the industrial distribution of our full sample of 
bonds (FS), meanwhile Panel B describes the bonds allocation to issuers in a 
particular region. The presenting data are for bonds with credit spread and 
bond total value in USD available, closed during the Jan 1993-Jan 2020 period.  
The industry distribution reveals significant differences between PF and CF 
bond issuances. Panel A shows that PF bonds issuances are concentrated in 
three key industries; i.e., Utilities (41.97%), Oil and Gas (24.21%) and 
Transportation (11.85%) account for 78.03% of all PF bonds by volume. CF 
bonds reveal a far less concentrated pattern: this type of bonds are mostly 
issued by firms belonging to Utilities (14.86%), Communications (12.13%), 
Machinery and Equipment (11.54%), Services (10.93%) and  Oil and Gas (9.56%) 
industries. Panel B shows that most of PF bond issuances are concentrated in 
North American and Latin American countries, while most of CF bond issuances 
area concentrated in North American and Western European countries. The 
United States is the region with the highest concentration of bond issues in 
terms of the amount traded, representing 38.45% of PF securities and 47.31% of 
CF securities by volume. 
 
Table 1: Industrial and geographic distribution 
 
 
Panel A: Industry distribution  
Industrial category of issuer 
















Commercial and Industrial 
      
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 2 525 0.19 885 244,570 1.44 
Communications 33 11,239 3.97 3,836 2,053,958 12.13 
Construction/Heavy Engineering 59 15,359 5.43 4,162 1,053,221 6.22 
Manufacturing 
      
Chemicals. Plastic and Rubber 6 3,380 1.20 1,641 554,985 3.28 
Food and Beverages 1 1,000 0.35 1,946 748,540 4.42 
Machinery and Equipment 9 3,387 1.20 4,408 1,955,066 11.54 
Steel, Aluminum and other Metals 1 175 0.06 1,314 403,651 2.38 
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Other 2 73 0.03 1,602 579,175 3.42 
Mining and Natural Resources 17 3,238 1.15 847 391,875 2.31 
Oil and Gas 118 68,447 24.21 3,386 1,618,532 9.56 
Real Estate 39 12,845 4.54 4,124 1,066,607 6.30 
Real Trade 5 738 0.26 1,475 580,250 3.43 
Services 28 5,877 2.08 4,591 1,851,508 10.93 
Utilities 330 118,662 41.97 7,837 2,516,095 14.86 
Transportation 94 33,504 11.85 3,629 1,078,324 6.37 
Public Administration/Government 18 4,196 1.48 21 5,114 0.03 
Other 1 100 0.04 729 233,859 1.38 
Total 763 282,746 100 46, 433 16,935,330 100 
       
Panel B: Geographic distribution 
Geographic location of issuer 















North America 391 152,450 53.92 22,117 8,845,470 52.23 
    United States 244 108,729 38.45 19,654 8,011,426 47.31 
    Canada 99 25,967 9.18 1,877 630,372 3.72 
United Kingdom 76 42,052 14.87 5,463 3,219,262 19.01 
Western Europe 51 14,330 5.07 2,337 1,109,361 6.55 
Eastern Europe 10 4,681 1.66 337 176,738 1.04 
Northern Europe 9 2,826 1.00 1,733 348,118 2.06 
Middle East 14 11,045 3.91 292 161,359 0.95 
    Qatar 7 5,630 1.99 21 15,223 0.09 
South Africa 3 3,250 1.15 94 31,218 0.18 
South East Asia 64 18,593 6.58 7,602 1,676,339 9.90 
    China 31 6,527 2.31 6,174 1,340,691 7.92 
    Malaysia 13 6,575 2.33 112 26,245 0.15 
Australia 36 12,049 4.26 677 218,146 1.29 
Latin America  99 17,552 6.21 1,849 341,671 2.02 
    Brazil 61 6,998 2.47 1,359 235,825 1.39 
    Chile 11 3,675 1.30 165 61,709 0.36 
Other  10 3,917 1.39 3,932 807,649 4.77 
Total 763 282,746 100 46,433 16,935,330 100 
 
Panel A describes the industrial distribution of bonds, whereas Panel B details the bond 
allocation to issuers in a particular country. Data are for bonds with credit spread and tranche 









4.2 Methodology and variable definition 
The main objective of our analysis is to determine which factors drive PF 
bonds credit spreads, namely to investigate how bonds’ contractual features, 
firms’ characteristics, and macroeconomic variables affect credit spreads. For 
this analysis, we use the model in equation (1): 
 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0+ 𝛽1𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡+𝛴𝑛=2
21  𝛽𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑛,𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽22 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 
𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡+𝜃 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜑 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡 
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
(1) 
 
where the subscripts refer to bond i at time t. 
We employ an OLS regression technique with credit spread as dependent 
variable, expressed in basis points, and adjust for heteroskedasticity. 
Considering the time varying risk premium and cross-country differences, we 
estimated standard errors clustered by year and country 
Our dependent variable, credit spread, corresponds to the option adjusted 
spread (OAS) 2, defined as the margin yielded by the security at issue above a 
corresponding currency treasury benchmark with a comparable maturity. 
Following the rationing of Pinto and Marques (2020), it is necessary to account, 
in credit spread computation, for the fact that the fixed rate bond carries 
interest rate risk, whereas a floater does not. Hence, to control this issue, we 
included a fixed rate dummy variable. 
For a detailed definition and source for all the variables used and the 
expected impact of explanatory variables on credit spread, see Appendix A.  
 
 
                                               
2We use the Option Adjusted Spread as it is the most common measure used by financial intermediaries to 
correct the normal yield spread for embedded options (e.g., the prepayment option), usually included in 
structured finance bonds (Cuchra, 2005; Fabozzi and Vink, 2012)  
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4.2.1 Credit Rating  
Credit rating is the most significant determinant of CF bond credit spreads. 
Cuchra (2005) argues that the importance of credit ratings in structured finance 
transactions, which includes PF, seems to be far greater than in the case of CF. 
In our sample all bonds have at least one credit rating assigned by Standard 
and Poor's (SandP) or Moody's, which is converted as follows: AAA=Aaa=1, 
AA+=Aa1=2, and so on until D=21 (Gabbi and Sironi, 2005; Cornaggia, 
Cornaggia, and Hund, 2017; Pinto and Marques, 2020). The lower the credit 
rating, the greater is the risk that the borrower fail to satisfy the terms of the 
obligation with respect to the timely payment of interest and repayment of the 
principal (Fabozzi, 2007) and therefore, the higher is the spread required by 
investors. Rating scales are inverse scales, so we expect a positive relationship 
between our variable credit rating and credit spread, so that an increase in credit 
rating also increases credit spread. As some bonds, namely PF bonds, are not 
rated, we included the dummy variable rated, equal to 1 if the bond has a credit 
rating from SandP and/or Moody's, and 0 otherwise. Additionally, as Gabbi 
and Sironi (2005), we  included a dummy variable rating discordance, equal to 1 
if the two ratings assigned by the two rating agencies have a different numeric 
value, and zero otherwise. If there is discordance about the rating, we expect a 
higher credit spread, as this would suggest uncertainty regarding the 
transaction’s default risk. 
4.2.2 Contractual Characteristics  
Despite the credit rating being the factor that most influences the credit 
spread of CF bonds, numerous empirical studies show that maturity, deal size, 
number of banks in the issuing syndicate, gross fees, among others contractual 
factors, convey information about the pricing of these bonds (Elton et al., 2001; 
Campbell and Taksler, 2003; Gabbi and Sironi, 2005; Chen et al., 2007). In the 
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structured finance literature, factors such as subordination level, collateral-type, 
currency risk, and the type of interest rate are also presented as determinants of 
credit spreads, when controlling for credit ratings (Vink and Thibeault, 2008; 
Fabozzi and Vink, 2012; Pinto and Marques, 2020). 
It is widely known that bonds with longer maturities tend to be riskier than 
bonds with shorter maturities. Therefore, investors usually demand higher 
premiums for longer-term securities. Several authors (Jones et al., 1984; Sarig 
and Warga, 1989; Gabbi and Sironi, 2005) argue that, on average, the term 
structure of spreads for investment grade bonds appears upward-sloping. 
Therefore, we expect a positive impact of maturity in the credit spread for CF 
bonds. For structure finance transactions, which includes PF, results suggest a 
non-linear (Sorge and Gadanecz, 2008) or negative (Vink and Thibeault, 2008) 
impact of maturity on spreads. Additionally, Pinto and Alves (2016) found a 
significantly negative relationship for a PF loans sample closed in both the U.S. 
and W.E. To control for maturity, we included the maturity variable. We also 
included the logarithm of maturity in our analysis, as a proxy for any non-linear 
relationships between credit spread and maturity. As for PF loans (Sorge and 
Gadanecz, 2008), we expect a hump shaped relationship between PF bonds 
credit spread and maturity.  
The higher the issue amount, the lower is the level of uncertainty and the 
higher is the liquidity level (Gabbi and Sironi, 2005; Chen et al., 2007). 
Additionally, Pinto and Alves (2016) presented a significant and negative 
impact of transaction size on the PF loans’ spread. For this reason, we expect 
larger issues to exhibit lower spreads for both, PF and CF bonds.  
The syndicate deal is structured to benefit each position from the credit 
protection of all subordinate positions, varying seniority and maturity claims 
(Navi, 2020). We used subordinated dummy variable to control for differences in 
risk existing among different tranches of a deal. This dummy is equal to 1 for 
bonds that are subordinated and we expect subordinated bonds to have higher 
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credit spreads than senior bonds. As Pinto and Marques (2020) and Navi (2020), 
taking into account the bank involvement and the differences in bank syndicates,  
we included variables number of banks and bank reputation. We expect a negative 
relationship between these two variables and credit spreads of both PF and CF 
bonds.  
According to Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) and Vink and Thibeault 
(2008), bonds issued in the currency of the borrower’s home country have lower 
spread than bonds subject to currency risk. In order to examine this factor, we 
used a currency risk dummy. We expect a positive relationship between 
currency risk and the spreads of both types of bonds. 
Nevitt and Fabozzi (2001) argue that, in PF transactions, the assets of the 
economic unit are seen as collateral for the loan. Kleimeier and Megginson 
(2000) show that the use of collateral is positively related to PF loan spreads. 
Thus, we expect a positive relationship between the collateralized dummy 
variable, which is equal 1 if the bond has a collateral, and PF bond credit 
spreads. 
We also expect a positive relationship between the credit spread and the 
callable dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the bond has a call option 
embedded.   
4.2.3 Firms’ accounting and financial variables  
The argument that investors should employ their own credit analysis instead 
of relying solely on ratings assigned by rating agencies is generally accepted, 
but may not be straightforward for some types of investment vehicles (Fabozzi 
and Vink, 2012). In the case of CF bonds, there are well-known metrics 
computed based on sponsors’/issuers’ financial statements that can be used to 
assess their creditworthiness. However, in structured finance, the key element 
is to legally separate the credit risk of the sponsor from that of the legal entity 
raising debt. Following Fabozzi and Vink (2012), in structured finance, 
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investors can look only to the performance of the collateral for fulfilment of the 
terms of the debt obligation rather than the performance of the corporation that 
used the securitization for funding.  
However, we want to examine if the financial metrics of the sponsoring firms 
actually have some influence on the pricing of PF bonds. Hence, we collected 
information about the main sponsor of the SPV for PF bonds, and about issuers 
for CF bonds. The most discussed variables beyond the credit rating, affecting 
CF bonds’ yield spreads are firm size, debt level, credit risk and profitability. 
The variable total assets refers to firms’ size (Mayberger, 2014). Fama and 
French (1993) argue that small companies can suffer long depressions in 
earnings that do not affect large companies. Additionally, Paschall and 
Hawkins (1999) state that investors demand higher risk premium to smaller 
firms because they are generally accepted as riskier. Thus, we expect that larger 
sized firms will have lower spreads.  
Flannery et al. (2012) show that when investors expect the debt of a firm to 
increase, the corporate credit spread should increase as well. As in Mayberger 
(2014), we used the debt to total assets ratio to capture information about a firm’s 
debt and we expect a positive relationship between this variable and the credit 
spread of PF and CF bonds; i.e., firms with lower leverage will have lower 
spreads.  
Duffie and Lando (2001) found a hump-shaped relationship between spread 
and maturity under perfect information and a downward-slopping term 
structure as imperfect information problems start gaining significance. Thus, 
we can conclude that asymmetric information affects bond’s credit spread. As 
Pinto and Alves (2020) we computed the EPS surprise variable as the difference 
between the actual earnings per share for year t and the earliest consensus 
(median) forecast for year t, deflated by the beginning of year t share price. We 
expect that bonds issued by firms with higher asymmetric information 
problems have higher credit spreads. Thus, we expect a positive relation 
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between higher earnings surprise and the credit spread for both PF and CF 
bonds. 
Following the same approach as Esho et al. (2001), Denis and Mihov (2003) 
and Pinto and Alves (2020), we used the Altman’s (1993) Z-score as a proxy for 
a firm’s credit risk. The higher the Z-score, the lower the firm’s bankruptcy risk 
and, consequently, lower the spread. Thus, we expect a negative relation 
between Log Z-score and the credit spread for both PF and CF bonds. 
As in Mayberger (2014) we used the return on assets to capture information 
about firm’s profitability. Bai and Wu (2016) argue that higher profitability 
reduce the corporate credit spread. Firms with higher operating profit margins, 
or other measures of profitability, are seen by investors as less risky (Grabowski 
and King, 2000). Thus, we expect that firms that are more profitable will have 
lower spreads. Additionally, we also computed the Fixed assets to total assets, 
Free Cash Flow to total assets and Market to book ratios to capture information 
about a firm’s asset tangibility, efficiency/value creation and growth 
opportunities, respectively. These factors are determinants of the choice of debt 
so we want to examine their effect on the credit spreads.  We expect a negative 
relationship between these three variables and the credit spread of both PF and 
CF bonds.  
4.2.4 Macroeconomic Factors 
We also control for macroeconomic factors such as the level of interest rates, 
given by the 3-month US Treasury bill rate, and the term structure of interest 
rates (UST5y- UST3M), estimated through the difference between the 5-year US 
Treasury bond yield and the 3-month US Treasury bill rate.  
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) argue that the level of 
investor protection influences the firm market value in international equity 
markets. Additionally, Hainz and Kleimeier (2012) and Subramanian and Tung 
(2016) show that creditor rights and legal regimes affect the choice of PF as a 
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funding alternative. We thus included the variable creditor rights, measured 
trough La Porta et al. (1998) indices . We also included a variable for enforcement 
level, which is an index for enforcing contracts, also obtained from World Bank 
Indicators. These variables control for unobserved country characteristics over 
time.   
Finally, we added two dummy variables, financial crisis and sovereign debt 
crisis to examine the impact of the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent 
European sovereign debt crisis on bonds spreads. As Riachi and Schwienbacher 
(2015), Pinto and Marques (2020) and Navi (2020), we also used year and 
industry dummy variables to control for unobserved macroeconomic and 
industry-specific trends.  
5. The pricing Project Finance bonds 
5.1 Univariate Analysis 
To perform a statistical analysis, we started by comparing PF and CF bonds 
characteristics (see Appendix B for a further analysis of variable characteristics).  
Table 2 presents Wilcoxon z-test and Fisher’s exact test comparing the values 
of each contractual variable in PF and CF bonds samples. When assessing credit 
spreads differences across deal categories, we find that the average credit 
spread for PF bonds (241.0 bps) and CF bonds (206.8 bps) differ significantly. In 
fact, on averaged, PF bond spreads are 34.2 bps higher than that of CF bond 
spreads.  
As expected, PF bonds have longer maturity. On average, PF bonds have a 
maturity of 13.7 years, which is a long period if we compare with the average of 
9.6 years of CF bonds. There is also a significant difference between the credit 
rating of PF and CF bonds. The average credit ratings for CF bonds (6.7|A-) 
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issues are significantly better than for PF bonds (8.5|BBB+), which may suggest 
that PF bonds are riskier than CF bonds. This also could reflect the country 
rating, since PF deals are more likely to be implemented in development 
countries; i.e., in riskier-than-average countries. The average country risk for PF 
bonds (4.0) borrowers is significantly higher than the corresponding value for 
CF bonds (2.7). Similarly, PF deals are more commonly extended to countries 
with lower creditor rights and lower legal enforcement.  
The mean (median) PF transaction size of $611.00 million ($450.00 million), 
which can be seen as a proxy for liquidity, is significantly higher than the CF 
mean (median) transaction size of $593.0 million ($321.0 million), indicating that 
creditors will require higher liquidity to lend through PF bonds. Although the 
number of tranches is, on average, higher in PF deals (2.0) than in CF deals (1.6), 
the average of banks involved in PF transactions (5.0) is significantly lower than 
the number of banks involved in CF deals (5.9). The difference between tranche 
size is not significant.  
 
Table 2: Univariate analysis- Bond’s contractual characteristics 
 















Univariate analysis- continuous variables             
Credit spread (bps) Transaction size ($ Million) 
Number 763 46,433 
-8.53 *** 
Number 763 46,433 
-6.37 *** Mean  241.0 206.8 Mean  611.0 593.0 
Median 195.0 145.7 Median 450.0 321.0 
Rating [1-22 weak] Tranche size ($ Million) 
Number 592 45,603 
-9.64 *** 
Number 763 46,433 
-1.36   Mean  8.5 6.7 Mean  371.0 365.0 
Median 9.0 7.0 Median 282.0 250.0 
Maturity (years) Number of banks 
Number 763 46,433 
-15.09 *** 
Number 763 46,433 
5.01 *** Mean  13.7 9.6 Mean  5.0 5.9 







Number of tranches Country risk [1-22 weak] 
Number 763 46,433 
-8.5 *** 
Number 763 46,433 
-6.05 *** Mean  2.0 1.6 Mean  4.0 2.7 
Median 1.0 1.0 Median 1.0 1.0 
Creditor rights [0-4 strong] Enforcement [32-85 strong] 
Number 763 46,433 
4.06 *** 
Number 763 46,433 
12.56 *** Mean  1.5 1.6 Mean  66.6 70.2 
Median 1.0 1.0 Median 68.7 72.0 
 














Univariate analysis- dummy variables             
Fixed rate         Currency risk         
Nr. of tranches 763 46,433 
0.000 *** 
Nr. of tranches 763 46,433 
0.000 *** Nr. of tranches with d=1 626 40,938 Nr. of tranches with d=1 244 9,806 
% of total 82.0% 88.2% % of total 32.0% 21.1% 
Callable         Subordinated         
Nr. of tranches 763 46,433 
0.100   
Nr. of tranches 763 46,433 
0.000 *** Nr. of tranches with d=1 395 22,639 Nr. of tranches with d=1 8 1,633 
% of total 51.8% 48.8% % of total 1.0% 3.5% 
Rated         Rating discordance         
Nr. of tranches 763 46,433 
0.009 *** 
Nr. of tranches 763 46,433 
0.005 *** Nr. of tranches with d=1 592 34,074 Nr. of tranches with d=1 186 13,435 
% of total 77.6% 73.4% % of total 24.4% 28.9% 
Collateralized                   
Nr. of tranches 763 46,433 
0.000 *** 
          
Nr. of tranches with d=1 284 3,671           






A larger fraction of both PF and CF bond credit spreads is fixed rate, 82.0% 
for PF bonds and 88.2% for CF bonds. PF bonds are more frequently issued 
with collateral, and have significantly lower cases of rating discordance than CF 
bonds. Most of PF and CF bonds are rated (77.6% and 73.4% respectively) and 
This table reports summary statistics for a sample of PF and CF bonds issued during the Jan 1993- Jan 2020 
period- Full Sample (FS). Information on the characteristics of bond issuances was obtained from DCM 
Analytics and Datastream. We test for similar distributions in contractual characteristics using the Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test for continuous variables and the Fisher's exact test for discrete ones. ***, **, and * indicates 
significant difference at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, between PF and CF bonds. Bond rating is based 
on the SandP and Moody's rating at the time of bond issuance. The rating is converted as follows: 
AAA=Aaa=1, AA+=Aa1=2, and so on until D=22. For a definition of the variables, see Appendix A. 
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there is a significantly lower fraction of subordinated bonds for PF compared 
with CF.  
In addition, we also compare the characteristics of PF sponsoring firms versus 
CF issuers. Table 3 presents a Wilcoxon z-test comparing accounting and 
market characteristics of firms per issuance typology. 
 
Table 3: Univariate Analysis- Firms’ characteristics 
 

















Univariate analysis- continuous variables             
Total assets ($ million)   Market to book   
Number 364 22,499 
-5.078 *** 
Number 364 22,499 
-3.198 *** Mean  97,800 45,100 Mean  384.50% 244.72% 
Median 26,200 17,800 Median 213.02% 181.70% 
Fixed assets to total assets     EPS surprise   
Number 364 22,499 
-0.725   
Number 303 19,534 
2.905 *** Mean  46.31% 44.70% Mean  -0.187% -0.398% 
Median 57.41% 43.88% Median 0.001% 0.043% 
Debt to total assets     Z-score         
Number 364 22,499 
2.628 *** 
Number 281 20,068 
7.092 *** Mean  33.98% 36.43% Mean  1.46 1.96 
Median 34.27% 35.44% Median 0.78 1.09 
Return on assets     FCF to total assets       
Number 364 22,499 
8.962 *** 
Number 352 22,116 
9.239 *** Mean  3.35 5.47 Mean  9.63% 12.67% 
Median 3.54 4.97 Median 5.49% 7.46% 
 
 
Results show that issuers of CF bonds are, on average, more levered firms.  
 
On average, firms that issue PF bonds are typically larger - with an average 
(median) size of $97.80 billion ($26.20 billion). As we expected, PF issuers have 
significantly higher default risk (lower Z-score), lower profitability (lower 
return on assets) and higher growth opportunities (higher market to book 
ratio), than those issuing CF bonds. Similarly, there is a significant difference in 
This table reports summary statistics for a sample of PF and CF bonds issued by 2,133 publicity traded firms 
located in OECD, between Jan 1993- Jan 2020 - High Information Sample (HIS). We test for similar 
distributions in public firms’ characteristics across samples via the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. ***, **, and * 
indicates significant difference at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, between PF and CF bonds. For a 




EPS surprise, confirming that PF sponsors suffer from higher asymmetric 
information problems than CF bond issuers.  The average debt to total assets 
ratio is 36.43% for CF bonds issuers and 33.98% for PF bonds issuers. Similarly, 
CF issuers have a significantly higher FCF to total assets ratio than PF issuers. 
5.2 Regression Results 
In this section, we perform a regression analysis to, first, examine whether PF 
bonds actually have credit spreads higher than CF bonds and, second, to examine 
whether the two bond types are influenced differently by common price 
characteristics. 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating equation (1) using each of the two 
samples discussed in section 3, the full sample of PF and CF bonds (FS) and the 
sample of bonds with sponsors’/issuers’ accounting and market information 
available (HIS). Models [1], [2] and [3] present pricing results for the full sample 
of 47,196 bonds, 763 PF and 46,433 CF bonds, respectively. Models [4], [5] and 
[6] present pricing results for the HIS, taking into account the core firms’ 
characteristics (Log total assets, Fixed assets to total assets, Debt to total assets, 
Return on assets and Market to book). Model [4] estimates the results for a 
sample including both PF and CF securities, while models [5] and [6] estimate 
the results for the sample of PF and CF bonds, respectively. 
5.2.1 Do Project Finance bonds have higher spreads than 
Corporate Finance bonds?  
Model [1] shows that PF bonds have higher credit spreads compared with CF 
bonds. In fact, they have, on average, 30.85 bps higher spreads than CF bonds. 
However, taking into account the core firms’ characteristics, this difference is 
lower. Model [4] shows that, on average, PF bonds credit spreads are 19.15 bps 
higher than CF bonds spreads.   
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Based on these results, we validate H3 that PF bonds are issued with higher 
credit spreads than similarly rated CF bonds. Therefore, H2 is rejected.  
5.2.2 Are Project Finance bonds and Corporate Finance bonds 
priced differently by common pricing factors?  
To answer this question, we examine the determinants of credit spreads for 
each bond type separately. We began by analysing the sign and significance of 
the coefficients for contractual and macroeconomic variables for FS models 
(models [2] and [3]). Secondly, based on models [5] and [6], we examine the 
impact of firms’ characteristics on credit spread for PF and CF bonds, 
respectively. 
Starting with the credit rating, there is a nonlinear relationship between 
credit spread and credit rating as the impact of one unit increase in credit rating 
increases as the credit rating deteriorates. Results confirm that credit rating is, 
in fact, the most important determinant of credit spreads in both PF and CF 
bonds, but investors do not rely exclusively on rating when pricing those 
bonds. We estimated models [1], [2] and [3] considering only rated and credit 
rating dummies as independent variables and find that models yield adjusted 
R2 values of 0.38, 0.29, 0.39, respectively. The inclusion of additional contractual 
characteristics and macroeconomic variables in these models increases their 
adjusted R2 values. In fact, on average, the adjusted R2  increases 0.24 for PF 
bonds and 0.18 for CF bonds. Models [4], [5] and [6] yield similar results, 
showing that the inclusion of additional variables of contractual, 
macroeconomic and firm characteristics, in addition to the credit rating, 
increases the explanation power of the model. Therefore, the credit rating is not 
the only determinant of the credit spread, investors rely on additional 





Table 4: Regression analysis of the determinants of PF and CF bond credit spreads 
 
 
Dependent variable: [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
   Credit spread (bps) 
PF and CF 
bonds 
[FS] 










Independent variables:       
   Intercept 211.5  *** 650.4 *** 115.2 62.95 371.4 -231.1 *** 
 (66.51) (175.9) (70.48) (95.61) (234.8) (65.99) 
   PF Bond 30.85 **   19.15 **   
 (14.47)   (7.970)   
   Rated -97.23 *** -131.6 *** -92.92 *** -73.02 *** -86.22 ** -68.83 *** 
 (9.684) (28.15) (9.935) (11.71) (32.99) (11.87) 
   AA+ -29.85 *** 55.17 -34.56 *** -49.64 *** -89.59 -52.29 *** 
 (9.561) (47.36) (9.420) (13.21) (57.25) (13.54) 
   AA -26.39 ** 63.87 * -31.65 *** -31.52 ** 37.49 -34.73 *** 
 (11.61) (32.66) (11.55) (13.27) (43.53) (13.15) 
   AA- -18.41 ** 150.3 *** -23.34 *** -6.490 8.027 -9.760 
 (7.529) (39.64) (7.484) (8.225) (53.72) (8.435) 
   A+ -3.143 42.92 -7.925 -2.867 -16.25 -6.351 
 (7.724) (33.21) (7.634) (6.698) (35.17) (6.929) 
   A 9.939 58.14 ** 4.845 8.991 16.05 5.396 
 (7.756) (26.17) (7.592) (7.105) (35.64) (7.249) 
   A- 24.00 *** 103.3 *** 18.97 ** 22.04 *** 23.47 18.25 ** 
 (7.611) (22.39) (7.513) (7.338) (26.33) (7.611) 
   BBB+ 54.91 *** 133.5 *** 49.33 *** 47.92 *** 10.87 43.83 *** 
 (7.857) (24.76) (7.800) (7.774) (32.00) (8.017) 
   BBB 72.75 *** 128.4 *** 67.82 *** 67.18 *** 93.18 *** 62.75 *** 
 (8.395) (21.17) (8.469) (8.615) (29.08) (8.875) 
   BBB- 113.4 *** 185.5 *** 107.7 *** 106.7 *** 141.4 *** 102.0 *** 
 (9.053) (24.16) (8.888) (9.694) (27.93) (9.597) 
   BB+ 187.9 *** 213.0 *** 182.9 *** 182.2 *** 232.3 *** 177.0 *** 
 (12.57) (43.09) (12.70) (15.29) (59.24) (15.14) 
   BB 204.0 *** 291.4 *** 198.0 *** 204.4 *** 201.6 *** 200.5 *** 
 (13.81) (35.16) (14.22) (16.06) (42.31) (16.38) 
   BB- 264.8 *** 409.7 *** 258.8 *** 251.6 *** 334.6 *** 246.9 *** 
 (13.81) (45.87) (13.98) (14.73) (45.67) (14.85) 
   B+ 317.1 *** 390.0 *** 311.0 *** 304.3 *** 178.4 *** 300.3 *** 
 (18.48) (44.67) (18.72) (19.65) (41.33) (19.80) 
   B 365.5 *** 400.9 *** 360.0 *** 345.8 *** 502.9 *** 340.5 *** 
 (21.83) (70.22) (21.96) (19.91) (106.0) (19.91) 
   B- 408.5 *** 505.2 *** 402.8 *** 389.3 *** 172.5 385.5 *** 
 (27.07) (97.47) (26.85) (22.02) (112.1) (21.68) 
   CCC+ 498.6 *** 562.1 *** 492.5 *** 487.5 *** 544.7 *** 481.8 *** 
 (25.01) (98.60) (25.05) (27.19) (50.68) (27.17) 
   CCC 545.3 ***  539.8 *** 578.2 ***  573.4 *** 
 (30.85)  (30.72) (34.62)  (34.77) 
   CCC- 511.5 *** -180.9 *** 545.6 *** 504.8 ***  500.9 *** 
 (56.92) (53.91) (43.33) (67.16)  (66.67) 
   CC 478.9 *** 510.8 *** 558.2 ***    
 (61.29) (50.94) (14.02)    
   C 357.2 ***  354.1 *** 431.3 ***  426.8 *** 
 (100.8)  (100.4) (51.80)  (52.22) 
   Rating discordance 26.55 *** 17.58 26.43 *** 18.39 *** -5.477 18.27 *** 
 (3.020) (13.80) (3.029) (2.646) (15.38) (2.666) 
   Maturity 1.039*** 1.304 * 1.022 *** 1.345 *** 0.350 1.340 *** 
 (0.152) (0.686) (0.157) (0.150) (1.040) (0.152) 
   Log maturity 0.0482 20.57 ** 10.35 *** -0.775 14.66 9.501 *** 
 (2.709) (10.02) (1.824) (2.397) (12.39) (1.845) 
       
     (Continued) 
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   Log transaction size -9.200** -36.81 *** -9.025 ** 6.289 ** -13.02 6.614 ** 
 (3.654) (9.032) (3.714) (2.772) (9.716) (2.854) 
   Subordinated -85.61*** 38.65 -85.92 *** -72.72 *** 87.97 -72.69 *** 
 (18.57) (46.91) (18.68) (17.09) (80.82) (17.28) 
   Currency risk 41.03*** 17.56 41.57 *** 30.23 *** 29.04 ** 29.89 *** 
 (5.205) (15.63) (5.242) (5.125) (13.68) (5.162) 
   Fixed rate -23.38** -62.10 ** -22.11 ** -17.77 * 0.142 -18.74 * 
 (9.189) (27.31) (9.061) (10.09) (33.85) (10.18) 
   Collateralized 63.22*** 35.61 ** 64.81 *** 34.62 *** 19.29 35.22 *** 
 (7.058) (16.75) (7.358) (6.085) (23.57) (6.411) 
   Callable 47.79*** 6.310 48.62 *** 34.02 *** 5.835 34.25 *** 
 (7.021) (11.64) (7.163) (6.417) (14.62) (6.482) 
   Number of  banks -1.365*** -2.599 * -1.362 *** -0.591 ** -0.861 -0.587 ** 
 (0.397) (1.505) (0.397) (0.279) (1.832) (0.279) 
   Bank reputation -0.00632 -0.345 0.00066 0.357 -0.176 0.337 
 (0.278) (1.055) (0.280) (0.326) (1.393) (0.328) 
   Number of tranches 1.453 2.874 1.497 -7.475 *** -13.03 ** -7.067 *** 
 (4.937) (5.292) (5.100) (2.329) (6.339) (2.425) 
   Country risk 5.359*** 8.604 *** 5.127 *** -1.507 -0.919 -1.518 
 (1.054) (2.167) (1.060) (1.636) (2.948) (1.682) 
   Creditors rights -7.156*** -8.066 -7.157 *** -2.379 2.927 -2.408 
 (2.218) (5.745) (2.230) (1.956) (8.385) (1.991) 
   Legal enforcement 0.687* 0.897 0.661 * 0.709 -1.696 0.711 
 (0.391) (0.745) (0.401) (0.454) (1.199) (0.467) 
   Volatility 2.650*** -0.156 2.687 *** 3.067 *** -1.514 3.126 *** 
 (0.634) (1.557) (0.633) (0.796) (1.620) (0.792) 
   USA5y-USA3M -0.0671 0.362 * -0.0733 -0.0735 0.392 * -0.0791 
 (0.0524) (0.210) (0.0520) (0.0517) (0.201) (0.0515) 
   Financial crisis 61.06 79.59 59.97 71.62 137.4 ** 69.40 
 (45.35) (130.4) (45.19) (52.19) (52.43) (51.67) 
   Sovereign crisis 43.60 -23.63 41.92 50.87 17.35 47.18 
 (47.37) (83.94) (47.20) (54.17) (88.39) (53.63) 
   Log total assets    -9.600 *** 3.678 -10.19 *** 
    (1.251) (4.133) (1.303) 
   Fixed assets to total assets    -24.13 *** 32.82 -24.95 *** 
    (6.702) (37.11) (6.818) 
   Debt to total assets    3.897 36.23 2.831 
    (7.733) (47.09) (8.107) 
   Return on assets    -0.707 ** 0.0936 -0.772 *** 
    (0.289) (0.721) (0.293) 
   Market to book    0.00801 -1.059 0.00793 
    (0.0144) (0.722) (0.0145) 
   Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
   Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 47,196 763 46,433 22,863 364 22,499 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.56 0.53 0.56 0.63 0.63 0.63 
Rated and rating dummies as independent variables only 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.38 0.29 0.39 0.44 0.43 0.44 
Differences in adjusted 𝑅2 0.18 0.24 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.19 
 
This table presents the results of an OLS regression analysis of the determinants of PF and CF bond credit 
spreads for: (i) a full sample of 47,196 bonds [FS] – model [1], of which 763 are PF bonds – model [2]- and 
46,433 are CF bonds – model [3]; (ii) a sample of 22,863 PF and CF bonds issued by 2,133 publicity traded 
firms located in OECD [HIS] – model [4], of which 364 are PF bonds- model [5]- and 22,499 are CF bonds- 
model [6]. For a definition of the variables, see Appendix A. ***, ** and * indicate that the reported 
coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics 
reported in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Due to time varying risk 




As we expected, rated bonds have lower credit spreads and the lower is the 
rating (higher credit risk), the higher is the credit spread. PF bonds with a credit 
rating of AA- have a 150.3 bps higher credit spread than AAA bonds. On the 
other hand, for CF bonds, the AA- dummy has a negative impact on credit 
spreads of 23.34 bps. Only bonds with A- rating have a significant positive 
impact on spreads: bonds with an A- rating have an 18.97 bps higher spreads 
than AAA bonds. This can be explained by the fact that there are a small 
number of CF bonds with A+ or better credit ratings. Results show that credit 
rating has a higher impact on credit spread for PF bonds than for CF bonds in 
higher credit rating scales. Rating discordance between SandP and Moody’s has 
a significant positive impact of 26.43 bps on credit spread for CF bonds. The fact 
that PF transactions are generally created to achieve a specific credit rating 
justifies the insignificant impact of this variable on credit spreads. 
Contrary to what we expected, the results show a significant and positive 
relationship between credit spread and maturity for PF bonds. Several studies 
about structured finance, namely about PF, argue that there is a non-linear 
relationship between maturity and credit spreads due to the special features of 
this type of arrangements. Therefore, such finds deserve further research 
attention.  
Results show that the transaction size has a significantly negative impact on 
credit spread for both PF and CF bonds. In fact, an increase in the transaction 
size by $100 million will reduce the credit spread by 36.81 bps for PF bonds and 
9.03 bps for CF bonds. These results indicate a positive price liquidity effect 
and, can also be explained by the creation of economies of scale related with 
larger amounts issued. Additionally, the number of tranches has an 
insignificant impact on credit spread for the both types of bonds.  
Callable and subordinated dummies have insignificant impacts on credit 
spread for PF bonds. For CF bonds, as we expected, bonds with a call options 
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have higher spreads. Surprisingly, the subordinated dummy has a significantly 
negative impact on CF bonds credit spreads.  
Currency risk has no significant influence on credit spreads for PF bonds, 
while there is a significantly positive relationship between this variable and CF 
bond credit spreads. Due to interest rate risk, we expected a negative 
relationship between fixed rate dummy and credit spreads. However, results 
show that, for both PF and CF bonds, the credit spread for fixed rate issues is 
lower than the credit spread for floating rate issues.  
Regarding the number of banks, we find, as expected, that a higher number 
of financial institutions involved in a bond issuance reduces credit spread for 
both PF and CF bonds, while banks’ reputation does not influences credit 
spreads. 
In line with Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), we find that collateralized PF 
bonds  are issued with higher credit spreads. For CF bonds, we also find a 
significantly positive impact on credit spreads. Although this result is 
surprising for CF bonds, it can be explained by the existence of collateralized 
bonds with lower credit rating classifications, suggesting riskier bonds. 
Regarding the macroeconomic factors, as expected, we find a significantly 
positive impact of country risk on credit spreads for both PF and CF bonds. In 
addition, results show that there is a negative relationship between creditor 
rights index and credit spread for both bond types of bonds, however, it is 
insignificant for PF bonds. The relationship between credit spread and the slope 
of the USD swap curve, USA5y-USA3M, is significantly negative for PF bonds, 
but insignificant for CF bonds. The impact of legal enforcement is insignificant 
for both bond types. We also find that market volatility has an insignificantly 
impact for PF bonds credit spread and a significantly positive impact on CF 
bonds credit spread. 
Sovereign crisis dummy is insignificant for both PF and CF bonds, while in 
model [5], we find a positive impact of the financial crisis dummy on PF bonds 
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credit spread, meaning that during this period there was a positive significant 
variance in PF bonds credit spreads.  
Regarding firms’ characteristics, we find that, for PF bonds, sponsors’ 
characteristics do not impact credit spreads. These results are in line with 
Fabozzi and Vink (2012) argument, showing that investors do not rely on 
sponsors’ characteristics when accessing PF bond credit spreads. The non-
recourse characteristic underlying PF debt leads lenders to focus on the project 
creditworthiness instead of those of the sponsors. In this sense, as Liu et al. 
(2006) and Pinto and Marques (2020), we can also argue that PF bonds credit 
spread depends mainly on the assets and cash flows promised as collateral. For 
CF bonds, as we expected, Log total assets, fixed to total assets and return on 
assets have a significantly negative impact on credit spreads, while debt to total 
assets seems to have a positive but insignificant impact. 
Overall, our results corroborate H1 that PF and CF bond issues are priced 
differently by common pricing factors and, as for CF bonds, investors rely on 
other factors besides credit ratings when pricing PF bonds.  
5.2.3 Additional sensitivity tests 
We re-estimated our models controlling for additional firms’ variables that 
either reduce our sample observations or have correlation with previously 
included variables. Hence, we re-estimate models [5] and [6] of Table 5 to 
examine the impact of these variables on credit spread: EPS surprise in models 
[7] and [8]; Log Z-score in models [9] and [10]; and FCF to total assets ratio in 
models [11] and [12]. 
We test the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of the EPS surprise 
variable and, surprisingly, we find a significant and negative relationship 
between this variable and credit spread for CF bonds. For PF bonds, although 




Regarding the Z-score, we find a significantly positively impact on credit 
spread for PF bonds, suggesting that investors required higher credit spreads 
for firms with lower bankruptcy probability. Although we didn´t expect such 
result, it can be explain by the perception of the investors about PF transactions. 
The company itself may be unlikely to default, however, when carrying out a 
PF transaction, the risk for the investor increases since it will be dependent only 
on the cash flows that the project generates and its performance for fulfilment 
of the terms of the debt obligation and not on the sponsor's ability to repay the 
debt. It is also important to mention that, when the Z-score is taken into 
account, the firm’s return on assets ratio becomes significant and sponsors that 
are more profitable are expected to issue PF bonds with lower spreads. For CF 
bonds, as we expected, Log z-score is significantly negative related to credit 
spread. 
Finally, there is an insignificant impact of the FCF to total assets ratio on 
credit spreads for PF bonds. However, this ratio has a significant positive 
impact on CF credit spread. Finally, model [11] also show that the financial 















Table 5: Regression analysis of the determinants of credit spreads – remaining variables 
 
 
Dependent variable: [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 













PF bonds [HIS] 
incl. FCF to 
total assets 
CF bonds [HIS] 
incl. FCF to    
total assets 
Independent variables:       
   Intercept 711.2 *** -297.8 *** 729.3 *** -261.8 *** 357.5 -222.3 *** 
 (258.9) (74.10) (258.3) (68.19) (242.5) (64.45) 
   Rated -83.43 ** -66.62 *** -99.27 * -62.85 *** -98.73 ** -65.60 *** 
 (33.11) (12.66) (51.41) (11.85) (39.71) (12.20) 
   AA+ -87.22 -42.34 *** -83.08 * -48.57 *** -76.49 -53.25 *** 
 (56.52) (14.40) (47.39) (12.95) (54.72) (13.59) 
   AA 54.90 -34.97 ** 48.31 -32.47 ** 50.31 -35.55 *** 
 (58.99) (13.95) (66.07) (12.82) (48.42) (13.26) 
   AA- -0.206 -7.245 -9.626 -7.384 12.91 -11.06 
 (63.60) (9.090) (60.61) (7.942) (59.04) (8.613) 
   A+ -22.19 -2.411 -60.67 -2.861 -10.51 -6.082 
 (39.96) (7.375) (47.56) (6.615) (38.97) (6.948) 
   A -11.87 10.01 12.76 7.425 26.01 5.874 
 (31.74) (7.685) (45.46) (6.670) (37.24) (7.323) 
   A- 15.56 23.71 *** 7.756 19.68 *** 30.79 18.14 ** 
 (27.56) (8.259) (35.28) (7.238) (28.38) (7.739) 
   BBB+ 5.533 49.26 *** -7.332 46.10 *** 17.46 42.79 *** 
 (35.35) (8.581) (35.85) (7.617) (32.18) (8.157) 
   BBB 82.63 ** 69.42 *** 81.77 ** 62.12 *** 98.89 *** 61.86 *** 
 (32.58) (9.605) (37.14) (8.496) (30.80) (9.059) 
   BBB- 123.9 *** 107.4 *** 118.9 *** 99.41 *** 150.1 *** 100.1 *** 
 (30.75) (10.48) (37.74) (9.385) (29.15) (9.811) 
   BB+ 219.5 *** 181.1 *** 238.1 *** 176.2 *** 240.1 *** 175.3 *** 
 (32.63) (16.89) (59.34) (14.76) (61.72) (15.49) 
   BB 190.8 *** 205.0 *** 195.1 *** 206.9 *** 205.3 *** 197.3 *** 
 (41.50) (18.08) (51.94) (16.05) (44.10) (16.55) 
   BB- 332.1 *** 246.4 *** 367.0 *** 246.6 *** 368.8 *** 245.6 *** 
 (56.31) (16.37) (53.58) (15.47) (50.18) (15.31) 
   B+ 117.5 303.8 *** 173.9 *** 292.7 *** 196.3 *** 300.1 *** 
 (73.33) (21.54) (58.49) (20.76) (48.18) (19.89) 
   B 510.7 *** 350.1 *** 486.0 *** 331.2 *** 513.6 *** 336.8 *** 
 (99.30) (21.29) (135.9) (21.88) (116.2) (20.65) 
   B- 199.4 * 391.6 *** 195.5 * 377.2 *** 181.3 383.9 *** 
 (112.4) (23.66) (115.5) (22.94) (112.6) (22.11) 
   CCC+ 517.0 *** 481.1 *** 554.7 *** 474.9 *** 569.1 *** 479.3 *** 
 (50.31) (30.81) (56.43) (27.90) (56.02) (27.47) 
   CCC  558.8 ***  577.4 ***  571.5 *** 
  (38.75)  (37.65)  (34.82) 
   CCC-  580.7 ***  499.0 ***  498.2 *** 
  (26.80)  (64.00)  (67.09) 
   CC       
       
   C  425.6 ***  429.2 ***  423.5 *** 
  (56.03)  (48.65)  (47.28) 
   Rating discordance -17.80 19.13 *** -0.384 19.49 *** -0.200 19.25 *** 
 (19.62) (2.908) (15.76) (2.876) (16.47) (2.652) 
   Maturity -0.349 1.439 *** -0.615 1.421 *** 0.302 1.356 *** 
 (1.378) (0.153) (1.372) (0.138) (1.075) (0.149) 
   Log maturity 22.58 9.508 *** 8.989 7.910 *** 14.34 9.476 *** 
 (13.94) (1.461) (14.76) (2.084) (12.66) (1.849) 
   Log transaction size -26.37 ** 7.949 *** -18.62 7.020 ** -12.15 6.533 ** 
 (12.30) (2.945) (11.32) (3.004) (10.56) (2.867) 
   Subordinated 173.1 -70.48 *** 190.4 -71.25 *** 102.5 -70.11 *** 
 (107.1) (18.36) (123.1) (17.24) (84.51) (17.66) 
     (Continued) 
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   Currency risk 36.62 ** 31.08 *** 53.04 *** 30.98 *** 30.85 ** 29.10 *** 
 (18.36) (5.088) (16.33) (5.298) (14.59) (5.061) 
   Fixed rate -4.830 -21.42 ** -27.47 -13.26 1.092 -19.24 * 
 (33.58) (10.45) (45.66) (9.872) (34.28) (10.17) 
   Collateralized 32.93 33.69 *** 28.03 29.58 *** 16.24 34.53 *** 
 (29.65) (6.453) (33.83) (5.777) (25.47) (6.359) 
   Callable 19.28 33.63 *** 2.845 28.48 *** 4.839 35.27 *** 
 (17.66) (6.590) (17.77) (5.842) (15.11) (6.563) 
   Number of  banks -0.132 -0.757 *** 0.628 -0.520* -0.708 -0.722 *** 
 (1.792) (0.285) (2.038) (0.292) (1.803) (0.268) 
   Bank reputation -0.989 0.386 -0.813 0.360 -0.0797 0.338 
 (1.696) (0.347) (1.706) (0.328) (1.473) (0.333) 
   Number of tranches -11.45 -7.132 *** -6.745 -7.271 *** -11.19 * -6.812 *** 
 (7.025) (2.607) (8.250) (2.603) (6.185) (2.408) 
   Country risk 0.391 -0.0952 -5.929 -0.670 -1.271 -1.322 
 (3.740) (1.704) (3.636) (1.715) (3.097) (1.690) 
   Creditors rights -2.113 -1.495 -4.926 -3.223 1.167 -2.431 
 (10.86) (2.054) (11.36) (2.069) (8.799) (2.023) 
   Legal enforcement -1.801 1.402 ** -2.029 1.226 ** -1.706 0.718 
 (1.605) (0.613) (1.318) (0.485) (1.203) (0.468) 
   Volatility -1.883 3.157 *** -2.192 3.140 *** -1.709 3.153 *** 
 (2.364) (0.756) (2.482) (0.779) (1.810) (0.793) 
   USA5y-USA3M 0.303 -0.0536 0.273 -0.0738 0.382 * -0.0775 
 (0.199) (0.0528) (0.243) (0.0518) (0.212) (0.0516) 
   Financial crisis 73.10 69.62 81.96 67.76 141.2 ** 68.50 
 (69.14) (50.50) (74.49) (52.30) (60.00) (51.58) 
   Sovereign crisis -23.44 47.47 56.26 49.58 18.94 46.14 
 (107.9) (52.06) (108.7) (54.24) (89.82) (53.54) 
   Log total Assets 1.235 -10.57 *** 2.089 -11.31 *** 4.139 -11.14 *** 
 (5.877) (1.389) (5.693) (1.433) (4.174) (1.363) 
   Fixed assets to total assets -6.407 -26.78 *** 20.82 -30.72 *** 32.63 -27.81 *** 
 (48.98) (7.516) (45.80) (7.699) (40.66) (6.930) 
   Debt to total assets 
54.07 2.343 97.75 -6.098 32.83 1.282 
(59.18) (8.298) (59.39) (9.262) (49.76) (8.150) 
   Return on assets 
-1.414 -0.831 ** -3.817 ** -0.469 0.267 -0.749 ** 
(2.204) (0.328) (1.749) (0.334) (0.743) (0.296) 
   Market to book -2.028 0.0135 -0.585 0.00958 -1.202 0.00828 
 (1.550) (0.0151) (0.782) (0.0151) (0.785) (0.0144) 
   EPS surprise 28.69 -17.00 ***     
 (205.7) (5.173)     
   Log Z-score   57.71 *** -12.24 ***   
   (18.49) (4.139)   
   FCF to total assets     1.671 0.306 *** 
     (3.179) (0.115) 
   Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
   Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 303 19,534 281 20,068 352 22,116 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.63 0.63 
Rated and rating dummies as independent variables only 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.46 0.44 0.40 0.44 0.44 0.44 
Differences in adjusted 𝑅2 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.19 
 
This table  presents the results of an OLS regression analysis of the determinants of PF and CF bond credit 
spreads for: (i) a sample of 303 PF bonds – model [7] and (ii) a sample of 19,534 CF bonds – model [8]; (iii) a 
sample of 281 PF bonds - model [9] and (iv) a sample of 20,068 CF bonds – model [10] ; v) a sample of 352 PF 
bonds– model [11] and vi) a sample of 22,116 CF bonds– model [12]. For a definition of the variables, see 
Appendix A. ***, ** and * indicate that the reported coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors. Due to time varying risk premium and cross-country differences, we estimate 
standard errors clustered by year and country. 
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6. The choice between Project Finance and Corporate 
Finance 
In this section, we intend to study the reasons that lead firms to choose 
between off-balance-sheet financing, via PF, and on-balance-sheet financing, via 
CF.  
6.1 Sample  
In the analysis of the choice of debt, the unit of observation is the deal. As we 
are using the database presented in section 3, multiple tranches (bonds) from 
the same deal appear as separate observations; e.g., PF deals typically consist on 
several tranches funding the same purpose. Therefore, to perform a deal-level 
analysis, we used data at the deal-level and, when necessary, we aggregated 
tranche-level data (e.g., spread, transaction size and maturity). In this 
aggregation process, we dropped some observations (bonds), since we require 
that information on all the tranches of each deal be available. Hence, we are 
able to analyse a full sample of 516 PF deals worth $266.7 billion and 36,035 CF 
deals worth $15,881.3 billion, closed in the Jan 1993- Jan 2020 period. We call to 
this first sample the Deals Full Sample (DFS).  
As in section 4, to test our hypotheses it is crucial taking into account the 
characteristics of the issuers. Therefore, our Deals High Information Sample 
(DHIS) consists of 16,788 deals closed by 2,093 publicity traded firms located in 
OECD countries between January 1993 and January 2020. 
Firms that closed the two types of deals in the sampling period, the 
switchers, are a very important field of study in this analysis. Table 6 presents 
information for a subsample of deals implemented such firms. Results show 
that PF and CF deals implemented by switchers are concentrated in four 
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industries: Utilities, Communications, Oil and Gas, and Transportation, which 
account for 82.3% of the total debt issued via bonds, between 1993 and 2020.  
 
Table 6: Industrial distribution of deals closed by switchers 
 









Commercial and Industrial         
 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 7 1  3,250    0.14 
 Communications 492 9  433,047    18.18 
 Construction/Heavy Engineering 70 4  32,994    1.39 
 Manufacturing       
  Chemicals. Plastic and Rubber 51 2 33,063 1.39 
  Food and Beverages 72 2 62,110 2.61 
  Machinery and Equipment 41 1 31,356 1.32 
  Other 30 1 5,409 0.23 
 Mining and Natural Resources 28 3 19,056 0.80 
 Oil and Gas 485 27 348,342 14.63 
 Real Estate 177 11 92,400 3.88 
 Real Trade 46 1 29,202 1.23 
 Services 126 6 90,440 3.80 
 Utilities 2,341 60 1,048,324 44.02 
Transportation 190 12 130,318 5.47 
Public Administration/Government 5 1 895 0.04 
Other 14 1 21,209 0.89 
Total 4,175 142 2,381,413 100 
 
This table describes the industrial distribution of deals closed in OECD countries by switchers 
with accounting and market data available. We classify as switchers firms that close both PF 
and CF deals during the Jan 1993- Jan 2020 period. We include only bonds with a deal type code 
of “corporate bond investment-grade” and “corporate bond high-yield. We classify as PF deals 




6.2 Methodology and variables 
In this section, our main objective is to examine firms’ choice between PF and 
CF, namely to investigate how deals’ contractual features, firms’ characteristics, 
and macroeconomic variables affect the choice between off-balance-sheet 
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financing, via PF, and on-balance-sheet financing, via CF. For this analysis, we 
utilized the logistic regression model presented in equation (2): 
 
𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝜃 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1   




where the subscripts refer to deal i at time t. 
Our dependent variable, choice of debt, is a binary variable equal to 1 if the 
firm closes a PF deal and 0 if it, instead, closes a CF deal. Although the 
dependent variables are the same as those used in the previous chapter 
regarding the analysis of bond pricing, an explanation of the approach used in 
this section follows. Again, Appendix A presents a detailed definition and 
source for all the variables used in this paper. 
6.2.1 Description of variables  
As in Denis and Mihov (2003), Altunbaş, Kara, and Marques-Ibanez (2010),  
Pinto and Alves (2020), we used firm’s size and asset tangibility- proxied by Log 
total assets and fixed assets to total assets ratio, respectively- to capture 
information asymmetries problems. We expect smaller firms and those with a 
lower degree of asset tangibility to prefer PF to CF. Additionally, we also used 
the EPS surprise as a measure of asymmetric information. It is expect a positive 
relationship between this variable and the choice of PF. As in Pinto and Alves 
(2020), we used the deal’s weighted average maturity (WAM), computed as the 
weighted average between the bond maturity, in years, and its weight in the 
deal size, to capture informational costs associated with liquidity risk induced 
by debt refinancing. We expect a positive relationship between WAM and the 
probability of a firm choosing a PF deal. 
Debt to total assets was used as a proxy for agency costs of debt. The market to 
book ratio  was used as a proxy of firm’s growth opportunities (Denis and 
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Mihov, 2003). We expect that firms that face higher agency costs of debt, higher 
leverage and higher growth opportunities will prefer PF vis-à-vis CF.  
Following the same approach as Esho et al. (2001) and Pinto and Alves (2020), 
we used the deal size as a proxy for economies of scale in relation to issuance 
costs. Taking into account the cost of structuring a PF deal compared to CF 
alternatives, we expect a positive impact of the Log transaction size in the choice 
of PF versus CF. Firm size can also test the issuance costs argument (Denis and 
Mihov, 2003), and, in this case, we expect that relatively larger firms prefer PF 
over CF. 
As a proxy of deal’s cost of borrowing we used the deal’s weighted average 
spread (WAS), computed as the sum of the product between bond spread and 
its bond size to deal size ratio. In WAS computation, we required that 
information about the spread for all bond tranches is available. Additionally, as 
in Esho et al. (2001), Denis and Mihov (2003) and Pinto and Alves (2020), we 
used the Altman’s (1993) Z-score as a proxy for a firms’ credit risk. We also 
computed the deal’s weighted average rating (WAR), computed as the sum of 
the product between bond rating and its bond size to deal size ratio. 
To examine the impact of firm’s profitability on the debt choice, we used the 
return on assets ratio and we expect a negative relationship between this variable 
and the probability of observing a PF deal. We also included the FCF to total 
assets ratio to capture firm’s efficiency and agency costs of free cash flow. We 
expect a negative relationship between this variable and the likelihood of 
choosing PF.  
We also control for macro-economic factor. Besides the variables used in 
Chapter 5, we add more three variables: civil vs common law dummy variable, 
risk free rate and GDP per capita. To control for the supply side conditions of 
bonds market we include the number of banks involved in each deal and the 
bank reputation. A final dummy variable - switcher - identifies firms that 
employ multiple debt types (PF deals and CF deals) within our sample period.  
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6.3 The characteristics of Project Finance and Corporate 
Finance deals  
Table 7 provides descriptive statistics for our samples of PF and CF deals 
between 1993 and 2020. When assessing WAS differences across deal categories, 
we find that the average WAS for PF (251.2 bps) and CF deals (216.0 bps) differs 
significantly. In line to what we showed in Chapter 4, in the bond market, PF 
deals have, on average, higher credit spread than CF deals. Our results show 
that PF deals are extended, on average, to projects in riskier countries than CF 
bond deals. PF deals average country risk (3.9) is significantly higher than that 
of CF (2.8) deals. Similarly, although the average WAR for PF (7.1|A-) deals is 
similar to the WAR for CF (6.7|A-) deals, results show that there is a significant 
difference between the two deal categories.  
The mean PF deal size of $517.0 million is significantly higher than the CF 
mean deal size of $441.0 million, which corroborate, so far, the hypothesis [H6] 
that sponsoring firms choose PF over CF to obtain economies of scale in relation 
to issuance costs. Similarly, PF deals have, on average, a significantly higher 
number of tranches. The average number of banks involved is higher for CF 
deals (5.6) compared with PF deals (5.0) and prestigious arranging banks 
participate more in CF deals rather than PF deals.  Regarding the maturity, PF 
deals have a WAM of 13.7 years, which is significantly higher than that of CF 










Table 7: Descriptive statistics for PF and CF deals’ samples 
 














Univariate analysis- continuous variables             
WAS (bps)         Number of banks   
Number 516 36,035 
-7.07 *** 
Number 516 36,035 
2.24 * Mean  251.2 216.0 Mean  5.0 5.6 
Median 206.6 153.0 Median 4.0 4.0 
WAR [1-22 weak]   Bank reputation    
Number 516 36,035 
-2.43 * 
Number 516 36,035 
1.91 * Mean  7.1 6.7 Mean  7.2 8.9 
Median 8.0 7.0 Median 3.0 4.0 
WAM (years)     Creditor rights [0-4 strong]   
Number 516 36,035 
-14.03 *** 
Number 516 36,035 
3.76 *** Mean  13.7 9.3 Mean  1.5 1.6 
Median 10.0 7.2 Median 1.0 1.0 
Deal size ($ Million)   Enforcement [32-85 strong]     
Number 516 36,035 
-6.7 *** 
Number 516 36,035 
10.52 *** Mean  517.0 441.0 Mean  66.8 70.6 
Median 380.0 270.0 Median 69.1 72.0 
Number of tranches   Country risk [1-22 weak]   
Number 516 36,035 
-5.06 *** 
Number 516 36,035 
-4.42 *** Mean  1.3 1.2 Mean  3.9 2.8 
Median 1.0 1.0 Median 1.0 1.0 
Variable of interest 
















Univariate analysis- dummy variables             
Currency risk         Sovereign crisis         
Nr. of deals 516 36,035 
0.000 *** 
Nr. of deals 516 36,035 
0.188   Nr. of tranches with d=1 164 7,197 Nr. of tranches with d=1 188 14,189 
% of total 31.8% 20.0% % of total 36.4% 39.4% 
Financial crisis         Civil vs Common law     
Nr. of deals 516 36,035 
0.005 *** 
Nr. of deals 516 36,035 
0.001 *** Nr. of tranches with d=1 14 1,937 Nr. of tranches with d=1 202 16,726 
% of total 2.7% 5.4% % of total 39.1% 46.4% 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of PF and CF samples of bond’s deals closed during 
the Jan 1993- Jan 2020 period- Deals Full Sample (DFS). Information on the characteristics of 
bond issuances was obtained from DCM Analytics and Datastream. We test for similar 
distributions in contractual characteristics using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for continuous 
variables and the Fisher's exact test for discrete ones. ***, **, and * indicates significant 
difference at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, between PF and CF bonds. For a definition of 
the variables, see Appendix A.  
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A significantly larger fraction of CF deals is closed in the financial crisis 
period (5.4%) compared to the sample of PF deals (2.7%). PF deals are less 
frequently extended to projects in common-law compared to civil-law 
countries. The average country risk for PF deals (3.9) is higher than the risk for 
CF deals (2.8) and PF deals are more commonly extended to countries with 
lower creditor rights and lower legal enforcement. CF deals (20.0%) are less 
likely to bear currency risk than PF deals (31.8%). 
6.4 The sponsor/issuer debt choice  
This section presents univariate and multivariate analyses examining how 
contractual variables and public firms’ characteristics influence the choice 
between PF and CF deals, while controlling for macroeconomic factors. Our 
sample comprises deals that are often divided into smaller tranches (bonds). 
6.4.1 Univariate analysis 
Table 8 reports characteristics of OECD public firms that were sponsors in a 
PF bond deal or borrowers in a CF deal. We subdivide these firms into three 
categories according to their borrowing record within our sample period. The 
PF and CF deals’ subsample is categorized as firms that close: [I] only PF deals; 
[II] only CF deals; and [III] both PF and CF deals. 
Although the difference is not statistically significant, firms that use only PF 
deals (firms in category [I]) are typically larger with an average size of $129.00 
billion. Surprisingly, results show that, on average, firms that use only CF have 
higher level of financial constraint. Firms with higher asset tangibility also 
prefer CF over PF deals. As we expected, firms in category [II] have higher 




Firms utilizing both markets (switchers) are smaller than those reliant on PF 
only, but higher than those using CF lending exclusively. Similarly, switchers 
have smaller Z-scores than firms that use only PF deals but lower Z-score than 
those that only use CF.  
 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics for public firms’ characteristics 
 
 
Firms categorized according to choice of deals 
 
Variable of interest 







PF and CF 
deals 
(switchers)    






  Mean  129,000 33,000 68,800 
  Median 10,600 11,600 32,800 






  Mean  29.15% 43.62% 56.43% 
  Median 12.81% 40.33% 62.16% 






  Mean  28.11% 37.77% 36.39% 
  Median 26.85% 36.58% 35.79% 






  Mean  2.02 5.41 4.74 
  Median 1.78 5.05 4.50 






  Mean  489.79% 252.34% 183.28% 
  Median 251.90% 176.84% 210.23% 






  Mean  -1.36% -0.61% -0.07% 
  Median -0.12% 0.04% 0.04% 






  Mean  1.57 2.21 1.42 
  Median 1.14 1.18 0.76 





b c   Mean  3.30% 13.34% 10.47% 
  Median 3.08% 7.52% 6.81% 
 
Our Deals High Information Sample (DHIS) includes 16,788 deals closed by 2,093 publicity 
traded firms, located in OECD countries between January 1993 and January 2020. We test for 
similar distributions in public firms’ characteristics across samples via the Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test. a denotes statistical difference at the 10% level between ‘PF deals only’ and ‘CF deals only’ 
subsamples; b denotes statistical difference at the 10% level between ‘PF deals only’ and ‘PF and 
CF deals’ subsamples; c denotes statistical difference at the 10% level between ‘CF deals only’ 
and ‘PF and CF deals’ subsamples. For a definition of the variables, see Appendix A. 
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Firms that used PF and CF simultaneously have higher leverage, profitability 
and efficiency ratios than firms in category [I]. On the other side, on average, 
switchers have lower debt to total assets, market to book and FCF to total assets 
ratios than firms that use only CF bonds deals. Regarding asset tangibility, 
firms in category [III] have a higher fixed assets to total assets ratio than firms 
belonging to the other categories. Differences in analysts’ forecast accuracy are 
not significant for our sample.  
Thus, so far, we find evidence supporting hypothesis that firms with higher 
growth opportunities and lower profitability prefer PF instead of corporate 
financing. Contrary to what we expected, results suggest that highly levered 
firms use CF to raise funds. Although PF is generally used by larger firms 
operate in capital-intensive industries, we only find evidence supporting the 
argument that larger firms and those with higher level of asset tangibility prefer 
PF for switchers.  
6.4.2 Multivariate analysis 
Table 9 reports the results of the logistic regression (2) to predict firms’ 
choice of debt between PF and CF deals. Estimations were developed following 
a stepwise approach, focusing firstly, on our DFS, examining the influence of 
contract characteristics on the debt choice- model [13]. Subsequently, the same 
estimation method was extended to include firms’ characteristics. This sample 
includes all deals closed in OECD for which we had accounting and market 
information about the borrowers (DHIS) - model [14]. Considering that Log Z-
score, FCF to total assets and EPS surprise imposes a significant reduction in the 
number of observations, we first exclude these variables from our baseline 
models and, subsequently, we re-estimated our models by adding each 





Table 9: Regression analysis of the determinants of public firms’ debt choice 
 
 
Dependent variable PF deal =1, CF deal = 0  
   Choice of debt [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] 
 
PF vs CF deals 
[DFS] 
PF vs CF deals 
[DHIS] 
PF vs CF deals  
[DHIS] incl. Log 
Z-score 
PF vs CF deals  
[DHIS] incl. FCF 
to total assets 
PF vs CF deals  
[DHIS] incl. EPS 
surprise 
Independent variables:      
   Intercept -5.827 *** -2.844 0.480 -0.658 -2.104 
 (1.898) (5.590) (5.496) (5.515) (6.398) 
   Log deal size 0.287 *** 0.284 ** 0.380 *** 0.326 *** 0.263 ** 
 (0.062) (0.111) (0.128) (0.115) (0.124) 
   Number of tranches 0.148 ** -0.022 -0.071 -0.036 -0.052 
 (0.074) (0.119) (0.152) (0.123) (0.143) 
   Currency risk 0.049 -0.212 -0.307 -0.228 -0.151 
 (0.148) (0.227) (0.263) (0.241) (0.240) 
   Number of banks -0.055 *** -0.021 -0.025 -0.015 -0.016 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.017) 
   Bank reputation -0.008 -0.016 -0.021 -0.012 -0.022 
 (0.001) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) 
   WA Spread 0.002 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
   WA Maturity 0.027 *** 0.018 *** 0.018 *** 0.018 *** 0.014 ** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
   WA Rating -0.063 *** -0.114 *** -0.119 *** -0.120 *** -0.112 *** 
 (0.018) (0.029) (0.034) (0.030) (0.033) 
   Financial crisis -0.907 ** -1.644 *** -1.770 *** -1.514 ** -1.610 *** 
 (0.434) (0.602) (0.637) (0.597) (0.586) 
   Sovereign crisis -0.078 -0.488 * -0.383 -0.433 -0.505 * 
 (0.243) (0.267) (0.318) (0.267) (0.283) 
   Log GDP per capita -0.224 * -0.053 -0.354 -0.297 -0.167 
 (0.134) (0.424) (0.406) (0.445) (0.465) 
   Country risk 0.095 *** 0.093 * 0.052 0.079 0.091 * 
 (0.030) (0.049) (0.053) (0.049) (0.053) 
   Civil vs common law -0.497 *** -0.716 ** -0.498 -0.809 *** -0.759 ** 
 (0.178) (0.279) (0.339) (0.299) (0.295) 
   Creditors rights 0.0980 0.350 *** 0.376 *** 0.368 *** 0.388 *** 
 (0.080) (0.090) (0.120) (0.097) (0.097) 
   Legal enforcement -0.036 *** -0.043 *** -0.048 *** -0.048 *** -0.032 * 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) 
   Risk free rate 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 * -0.002 * -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
   Volatility -0.013 -0.033 ** -0.031* -0.037 ** -0.057 *** 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) 
   USA5y-USA3M -0.001 -0.003 ** -0.004 *** -0.003 ** -0.002 * 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
   Switcher 2.322 *** 3.159 *** 3.406 *** 3.125 *** 3.335 *** 
 (0.135) (0.212) (0.240) (0.212) (0.237) 
      
      
     (Continued) 
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   Log total assets  -0.197 *** -0.326 *** -0.185 ** -0.183 ** 
  (0.075) (0.063) (0.079) (0.084) 
   Debt to total asset  0.023 -0.212 0.007 0.192 
  (0.634) (0.558) (0.634) (0.611) 
   Fixed assets to total assets  -0.730 ** -0.215 -0.546 * -0.662 
  (0.372) (0.412) (0.319) (0.434) 
   Market to book  0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 ** 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
   Return on assets  -0.030 * 0.001 -0.016 -0.032 *** 
  (0.016) (0.010) (0.021) (0.011) 
   Log Z-score   -0.578 ***   
   (0.217)   
   FCF to total assets    -4.237  
    (2.938)  
   EPS surprise     -0.159 
     (0.242) 
Number of observations 36,551 16,788 14,831 16,445 14,491 
Corrected predictions (%) 98.58% 98.49% 98.59% 98.52% 98.53% 
Pseudo-𝑅2 0.165 0.218 0.242 0.226 0.234 
 
This table presents the results of logistic regressions which predict public firms’ choice between 
PF and CF. The dependent variable equals 1 when a firm selects PF lending and 0 when it 
chooses a CF deal. Model [13] was estimated for the full sample of 36,551 deals, closed between 
January 1993 and January 2020 (DFS),. Model [14] was estimated for a sample of 16,788 deals, 
closed by 2,093 publicity traded firms located in OECD countries between January 1993 and 
January 2020 (DHIS), for which we have information on firms’ characteristics. Models [15], [16] 
and [17] include additional firms’ characteristics. For a definition of the variables, see Appendix 
A. ***, ** and * indicate that the reported coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Due to time varying risk premium and cross-
country differences, we estimate standard errors clustered by year and country. 
 
 
As we expected, results document that borrowers located in risky countries, 
with lower GDP per capita and lower legal enforcement prefer PF rather than 
CF. Additionally, we find that the civil law vs common law dummy variable 
and the number of banks involved in the transaction have a negative impact on 
the probability of observing a PF deal. The level of interest rates, market 
volatility, and the creditor rights’ level do not affect significantly the probability 
of observing a PF deal. Finally, we find that the financial crisis dummy variable 






Information asymmetries  
As we expected, relatively smaller firms and those with a lower degree of 
asset tangibility prefer PF vis-à-vis CF (model [14]). Regarding the EPS surprise, 
results show that this variable do not have a significant impact on the choice of 
debt (model [17]). These findings corroborate H4. Firms with more severe 
information problems tend to use PF transactions because they disclose private 
information to a limited number of informationally sophisticated investors, are 
helpful in mitigating informational asymmetries (Pinto and Santos, 2019).  
In line with the argument that by reducing the level of asymmetric 
information between lenders and borrowers, structure finance enables 
borrowers to raise funding with longer maturities (Flannery, 1986; Diamond, 
1991), we find that WAM has a positive influence on the choice of a PF deals, 
meaning that the sponsors choose PF when they seek long-term funding for a 
specific large-scale project. 
Agency costs of debt and growth opportunities  
Although results show that the level of financial constraint and the potential 
firm’s growth opportunists affect positively the choice of PF over CF, we only 
find a significant impact on the choice of debt for the market to book ratio 
(model [17]). However, this significant impact happens only for a small sample 
when we taking into account the EPS surprise. Therefore we did not find 
significant evidence to corroborate H5. 
Issuance costs  
Our findings regarding issuance costs are twofold. First, results reported in 
model [1] shows that deal size and the number of tranches positively affects the 
probability of observing a PF deal. Second, as previous mentioned, firm size is 
significantly negatively related to the probability of observing a PF deal. These 
results are in line with descriptive statistics in Table 7.  Although the average 
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size of PF issuers is higher than the average size of CF issuers, there is not a 
significantly difference. Therefore, we believe that, in this case, firm size seems 
to be well suited to measure information asymmetries than capturing effects of 
economies of scale.  
These results corroborate the hypothesis that borrowers choose PF over CF 
when issuing large amounts of debt to benefit from potential economies of scale 
[H6]. 
 
Cost of funding  
The borrowing cost is given by the deal’ associated credit spread. We find 
that there is a significantly positive relationship between WAS and the 
probability of observing a PF deal. Meaning that PF deals are more likely to 
have higher funding costs than CF deals. Additionally, we found a significantly 
negative influence of both WAR and Z-score on the choice of PF vis-à-vis CF 
(models [1] and [15]). These results are in line with our findings in Chapter 4. 
PF bonds have, on average, significantly higher credit spreads and credit 
ratings than CF bonds. Results also show that sponsoring firms with higher 
credit risk prefer PF over CF and choose PF when such transactions allow the 
issuance of bonds with better WAR.  
Therefore these findings corroborate our hypothesis that PF transactions do 
not allow the reduction of sponsors’ cost of borrowing when compared with CF 
transactions [H3], thus we reject H2. 
Profitability 
We find that profitability reduces the likelihood of accessing PF markets, 
which corroborates structured finance literature: firms choose off-balance-sheet 
financing to improve or maintain sponsors’ key financial ratios (Caselli and 
Gatti, 2005; Fabozzi, Davis, and Choudhry, 2016). Therefore we accept H7.   
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6.4.3 Focusing on the switchers 
Switchers are in fact the firms that use extensively both on-and off-balance-
sheet debt. Therefore, a switcher-focused analysis may provide interesting 
insights into the choice determinants. Additionally, it will address endogeneity 
concerns that may arise in the choice between PF and CF in the previous 
section, since we do not know whether the PF was chosen because the company 
has high credit risk and did not get access to CF or because the company simply 
opted for project financing over CF.  
Table 10 reports the results of using the logistic regression (2) to predict 
switcher’s choice of debt between PF and CF deals. 
Results show that switchers resorting to PF are relatively smaller and less 
profitable. In line with the idea that for larger debt issuances PF transactions 
allow sponsors to benefit from potential economies of scale, we find a positive 
relationship between the deal size and the likelihood of a switcher choose a PF 
transaction. Regarding the cost of borrowing, as in the previous analysis, the 
probability of observing a PF deal is positively related with higher WAS and 
lower WAR, suggesting that PF transactions evolves higher borrowing costs 
compared with CF deals. The number of banks and its reputation is negatively 
related with the likelihood of switchers choose a PF deal.  
PF deals issued by switchers are more likely to be closed in riskier countries 
with higher creditor’s rights and lower levels of legal enforcement. 
Additionally, the level of interest rates is negatively related with the probability 
of observing a PF deal. During the period of the financial crisis, switchers were 







Table 10: Regression analysis of the determinants of switchers’ debt choice 
 
Dependent variable PF deal =1, CF deal = 0 
   Choice of debt [18] [19] [20] [21] 
 
PF vs CF deals 
[DHIS] | 
Switchers 
PF vs CF deals  
[DHIS] incl. Log 
Z-score |  
Switchers 
PF vs CF deals  
[DHIS] incl. FCF 
to total assets |  
Switchers 
PF vs CF deals  
[DHIS] incl. 
EPS surprise |  
Switchers 
Independent variables:     
   Intercept -8.887 -7.118 -6.836 -7.524 
 (6.211) (5.918) (6.260) (6.945) 
   Log deal size 0.429 *** 0.487 *** 0.454 *** 0.451 *** 
 (0.108) (0.135) (0.108) (0.128) 
   Number of tranches 0.000 -0.028 -0.011 0.035 
 (0.134) (0.178) (0.140) (0.149) 
   Currency risk 0.0120 -0.130 -0.048 0.117 
 (0.253) (0.267) (0.275) (0.253) 
   Number of banks -0.032 * -0.036 * -0.027 -0.035 * 
 (0.019) (0.022) (0.018) (0.019) 
   Bank reputation -0.042 ** -0.048 ** -0.033 -0.035 * 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.020) 
   WA Spread 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.003 *** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
   WA Maturity 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) 
   WA Rating -0.143 *** -0.122 *** -0.149 *** -0.120 *** 
 (0.034) (0.040) (0.037) (0.037) 
   Financial crisis -3.019 *** -2.767 *** -2.915 *** -2.515 *** 
 (0.745) (0.808) (0.736) (0.709) 
   Sovereign crisis -0.432 -0.347 -0.413 -0.366 
 (0.293) (0.322) (0.287) (0.314) 
   Log GDP per capita 0.589 0.325 0.369 0.403 
 (0.499) (0.478) (0.526) (0.536) 
   Country risk 0.142 ** 0.104 0.124* 0.117 * 
 (0.070) (0.069) (0.071) (0.071) 
   Civil vs common law -0.405 -0.086 -0.493 -0.431 
 (0.393) (0.430) (0.412) (0.401) 
   Creditors rights 0.290 ** 0.384 *** 0.331 ** 0.298 ** 
 (0.122) (0.144) (0.133) (0.118) 
   Legal enforcement -0.030 * -0.037 ** -0.035 * -0.019 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
   Risk free rate -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
   Volatility -0.030 * -0.033 * -0.036 ** -0.049 ** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.0205) 
   USA5y-USA3M -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
     
     
     
     
    (Continued) 
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   Log total assets -0.311 *** -0.331 *** -0.296 *** -0.337 *** 
 (0.087) (0.090) (0.098) (0.098) 
   Debt to total asset 0.685 0.504 0.770 1.009 
 (0.758) (0.729) (0.742) (0.740) 
   Fixed assets to total assets -0.126 0.471 -0.062 -0.276 
 (0.453) (0.511) (0.431) (0.505) 
   Market to book 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
   Return on assets -0.044 ** -0.011 -0.039 -0.039 * 
 (0.022) (0.027) (0.026) (0.023) 
   Log Z-score  -0.498   
  (0.314)   
   FCF to total assets   -0.980  
   (2.518)  
   EPS surprise    0.297 
    (1.292) 
Number of observations 3,599 3,295 3,479 3,129 
Corrected predictions (%) 94,5% 94.7% 94.5% 94.4% 
Pseudo-𝑅2 0.108 0.126 0.114 0.107 
 
This table presents the results of logistic regressions which predict public firms’ choice between 
PF and CF. The dependent variable equals 1 when a switcher selects PF and 0 when it chooses a 
CF. For a definition of the variables, see Appendix A. ***, ** and * indicate that the reported 
coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The 
t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
Due to time varying risk premium and cross-country differences, we estimate standard errors 















This dissertation compares credit spreads and pricing processes for a sample 
of project finance (PF) and corporate financing (CF) bonds issued in the Jan 
1993- Jan 2020 period. Additionally, we examine firms’ borrowing decisions, 
namely the factors that influence sponsors’/issuers’ choice between off-balance 
sheet financing, via PF, and on-balance sheet financing, via CF. 
Our findings indicate that, although the credit ratings are the most important 
determinants of both PF and CF bond credit spreads, they seem to incorporate 
additional information beyond these ratings. We conclude that PF bonds have, 
on average, 30.85 bps higher credit spreads than CF bonds. This difference 
decreases to 19.15 bps, taking into account the characteristics of the sponsors/ 
issuers when pricing the two bond types. In analysing the determinants of 
credit spreads for PF bonds, we show that the most important pricing 
determinants are credit ratings, bond maturity, transaction size, interest rate 
type (fixed versus floating), number of banks involved, if the bond is 
collateralized, country risk, the yield curve slope and sponsors’ credit risk. As 
in extant empirical literature, we show that contractual (credit rating, rating 
discordance, maturity, transaction size, subordinated, currency risk, fixed rate, 
collateralized, callable, number of banks) and macroeconomic variables (country 
risk, creditors rights, legal enforcement, volatility) explain CF bond credit spreads. 
We also show that issuers’ characteristics, like size, asset tangibility, 
profitability (return on assets), default risk and the capability of creating market 
value also affect credit spreads.  
By comparing firms’ debt choices, our results show that PF is in fact a 
mechanism that facilitates the reduction of the deadweight costs from 
asymmetric information problems. Results are consistent with the argument 
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that borrowers choose PF when issuing large amounts of debt to benefit from 
potential economies of scale. However, in line with our results regarding bonds’ 
pricing, we can argue that PF is more costly than CF. Finally, we find that that 
firms resorting to PF are less profitable and have higher credit risk than 
comparable firms that use CF. 
This work presents a detailed analysis about the pricing of PF and CF bonds, 
identifying the most important determinants of credit spreads at issuance. It 
provides an empirical perspective of the dissimilarities in the pricing 
determinates of PF and CF bonds in relation to contractual characteristics, 
issuers’ accounting and market characteristics and macroeconomic factors. In 
addition, it provides an empirical analysis of the choice between PF and CF 
having as background the international bond market. We consider that a 
further research on the impact of PF on sponsoring firms’ cost of borrowing, 
considering other factors that affect contract design would be very interesting. 
Furthermore, there is also room to a deeper research on the term structure of PF 
bond credit spreads to better understand the relationship between credit spread 
and maturity. Finally, we consider that a study focusing on the choice between 
loans and bonds inside to fund a PF deal will be extremely useful, extending 
extant literature on the debt choice between bank loans and bonds (e.g., Denis 
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Appendix A: Variable definition 
 
 
Variable Name Variable definition Source 
Expect impact on spread 
PF bond CF bond 
Dependent Variables    
   Credit spread 
Margin yielded by the security at issue above a corresponding 
currency treasury benchmark with a comparable maturity (OAS). 
DCM Analytics     
   Choice of debt 
Dummy equal to 1 if the firm closes a PF deal and 0 if it, instead, 
closes a CF deal. 
Pinto and Alves 
(2020) 
    
Independent variables  
   Contractual characteristics 
     Rated 
Dummy equal to 1 if the bond has a credit rating from SandP or 
Moody's, and 0 otherwise. 
DCM Analytics - - 
     Rating 
Bond rating based on the SandP and Moody's rating at the time of bond 
issuance. The rating is converted as follows: AAA=Aaa=1, 
AA+=Aa1=2, and so on until D=22. 
DCM Analytics + + 
     Rating discordance 
Dummy equal to 1 if SandP and Moody's assign a different credit 
rating for the same tranche, and 0 otherwise. 
DCM Analytics + + 
     Maturity Maturity of bonds, in years. DCM Analytics NL/ - + 
     Transaction size 
Bond transaction size. Transaction size is converted into Euro millions 
when necessary. 
DCM Analytics - - 
     Subordinated Dummy equal to 1 for tranches that are subordinated, and 0 otherwise. DCM Analytics + + 
     Number of tranches The number of tranches per transaction. DCM Analytics - + 
     Currency risk 
Dummy equal to 1 for bonds that are denominated in a currency 
different from the currency in the deal's nationality and 0 otherwise. 
DCM Analytics + + 
     Fixed rate Dummy equal to 1 if a bond is fixed price and 0 otherwise. DCM Analytics + + 
     Number of banks 
The number of financial institutions participating in bond issuance, as 
bookrunners, underwriters or servicers. 
DCM Analytics - - 
     Bank reputation 
Bookrunners rank according to Thomson Reuters League Tables. 




NL/ - - 
     Collateralized Dummy equal to 1 if a bond is collateralized, and 0 otherwise. DCM Analytics + NA 
     Management fee Fees (in bps) that are periodically paid to the bank syndicates. DCM Analytics + + 
     Gross spread Gross spread (in bps) per tranche as given by bookrunner. DCM Analytics + + 












   Firm characteristics   
     Log total assets Natural logarithm of firm total assets measured in $ million. Datastream - - 
     Debt to total assets The ratio of total debt to total assets. Datastream + + 
     Fixed assets to total 
assets 
The ratio of fixed assets to total assets. Fixed assets include property, 
plant and equipment. 
Datastream - - 
     Market to Book 
The sum of book value of liabilities and market value of equity divided 
by the book value of assets. 
Datastream - - 
     Return on Assets 
The net income before preferred dividends minus preferred dividend 
requirement, divided by total assets. 
Datastream - - 
     EPS surprise 
Difference between the actual earnings per share for year t and the 
earliest consensus (median) forecast for year t, deflated by beginning 
of year t share price. 
Datastream + + 
     Log Z-score 
Logarithm of Altman’s (1993) Z-score. Altman’s Z-score is calculated 
as Z= 1.2 (Working Capital/Total Assets) + 1.4 (Retained 
Earnings/Total Assets) + 3.3 (Earnings Before Interest and 
Taxes/Total Assets) + 0.6 (Market Value of Equity/Book Value of 
Liabilities) + 0.999 (Net Sales/Total Assets). 
Datastream - - 
     FCF to total assets The ratio of Free Cash Flow to total assets.  Datastream - - 
   Macroeconomic factors 
     Risk free rate 
The yield on a 3-month U.S. Treasury bill at the deal closing date - a 
proxy for the general level of interest rates. 
Datastream - - 
     Volatility 
The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX). VIX 
reflects a market estimate of future volatility. 
Datastream + + 
     EUSA5y-Libor3M 
The slope of the U.S. Treasury swap curve. Obtained as the difference 
between the five-year U.S. Treasury Bond Yield and the 3-month U.S. 
Treasury bill. 
Datastream - - 
     Country risk 
Moody's country credit rating at close. The rating is converted as 




     Financial crisis 
Dummy equal to 1 if the closing date falls within the 2007-2008 
financial crisis period (September 15, 2008 – December 31, 2014) and 
0, otherwise. 
Pinto and Alves 
(2020) 
+ + 
     Sovereign crisis 
Dummy equal to 1 if the closing date falls within the sovereign debt 
crisis period (April 24, 2010 – December 31, 2016) and 0, otherwise. 
Pinto and Alves 
(2020) 
+ + 
     Creditor rights 






     Legal enforcement 
The annual score for enforcing contracts, calculated as the simple 
average of the scores for each of the component indicators: the time 
and cost for resolving a commercial dispute through a local first-
instance court, as well as the quality of judicial processes that promotes 
quality and efficiency in the court system. 
World Bank - - 
     Civil vs common 
law 
Civil law dummy takes the value 1 for civil law countries and the value 
0 for common-law countries. 
LLSV (1998) + + 
     Log GDP per capita 
Logarithm of gross national income per capita expressed in USD from 
World Development Indicators. 
World Bank - - 
 
The following characters mean: – = negative impact on the credit spread | + = positive impact on 





Appendix B: Descriptive statistics for PF and CF bond samples 
 
 
Panel A: Continuous variables               
Variable of interest 
Project Finance Bonds   Corporate Finance Bonds 
Number Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max 
  
Number Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max 
Contractual characteristics                     
Credit spread (bps) 763 241.0 195.0 180.3 1.2 1,025   46,433 206.8 145.7 193.3 -4.8 1,092 
Rating [1-22 weak] 592 8.5 9.0 3.5 1.0 20.0   45,603 6.7 7.0 5.1 0.0 21.0 
Maturity (years) 763 13.7 10.0 9.7 1.5 100.0   46,433 9.6 7.1 8.4 1.0 100.4 
Transaction size ($ Million) 763 611.0 450.0 522.0 12.0 3,000.0   46,433 593.0 321.0 704.0 3.2 
3,990.
0 
Tranche size ($ Million) 763 371.0 282.0 332.0 3.8 2,000.0   46,433 365.0 250.0 345.0 0.0 
3,800.
0 
Number of tranches 763 2.0 1.0 1.7 1.0 12.0   46,433 1.6 1.0 1.2 1.0 21.0 
Number of banks 763 5.0 4.0 4.3 1.0 24.0   46,433 5.9 4.0 5.1 0.0 46.0 
Bank reputation [1-25 best] 763 7.3 3.0 8.0 1.0 25.0   46,433 8.2 3.0 9.2 1.0 25.0 
Macroeconomic factors                     
Country risk [1-22 weak] 763 4.0 1.0 4.2 1.0 17.0   46,433 2.7 1.0 2.9 1.0 21.0 
Volatility 763 17.6 15.9 6.4 9.4 45.8   46,433 17.8 16.0 7.0 9.1 80.9 
USA5y-USA3M (bps) 763 96.5 91.8 65.2 
-
85.4 284.2   46,433 108.5 105.0 71.8 
-
86.7 307.5 
Creditor rights  763 1.5 1.0 1.1 0.0 4.0   46,433 1.6 1.0 0.9 0.0 4.0 
Enforcement [32-85 strong] 763 66.6 68.7 8.6 32.4 84.1   46,433 70.2 72.0 6.6 32.4 84.1 
Panel B: Dummy variables               
Variable of interest 
Project Finance Bonds   Corporate Finance Bonds 
Number % of total Std. Dev.   Number % of total Std. Dev. 
Rated 763 77.6% 0.42   46,433 73.4% 0.44 
Subordinated 763 1.0% 0.10   46,433 3.5% 0.18 
Collateralized 763 37.2% 0.48   46,433 7.9% 0.27 
Currency risk 763 32.0% 0.47   46,433 21.1% 0.41 
Fixed Rate 763 82.0% 0.38   46,433 88.2% 0.32 
Rating discordance 763 24.4% 0.43   46,433 28.9% 0.45 
Callable 763 51.8% 0.50   46,433 48.8% 0.50 
Financial crisis 763 2.6% 0.16   46,433 5.6% 0.23 
Sovereign crisis 763 35.9% 0.48   46,433 40.0% 0.49 
 
